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I. INTRODUCTION
Xenon Valiant was always curious about his ancestry.  He did not know 
his parents very well because they passed away when he was very young. 
Xenon discovered on the Internet that he could get his whole genome 
sequenced1 and possibly trace his ancestry and disease risks for $10,395,2 
which was out of his reach.  While he was debating whether to open a 
savings account, he saw an Internet ad calling for participants for a whole 
genome sequencing study.3  Xenon seized the opportunity to learn about 
1. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND
PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 22 (Oct. 2012), http://bioethics.gov/sites/
default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/5XXV-DXGJ].  Whole genome 
sequencing refers to the process of reading the complete deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
sequence of the organism.  Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) Program, U.S.  FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenome 
SequencingProgramWGS [http://perma.cc/TFP8-7YQB].
2. Research Genetics, GENE BY GENE, https://www.genebygene.com/pages/research?
goto=cma [https://perma.cc/8HPJ-E54K] (last visited July 3, 2015) (providing direct-to­
consumer whole genome sequencing for $10,395). 
3. See, e.g., Clinical Research at Yale, YALE SCHOOL OF MED., http://www.yale 
studies.org/ [http://perma.cc/C6VB-CTEW] (last visited Dec. 18, 2014); Patient Recruitment 
at the NIH Clinical Center, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH CLINICAL CTR., http://www.cc.nih. 
gov/recruit [http://perma.cc/R9ES-L3H4] (last updated July 24, 2015); Recruiting Study 
Subjects, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Feb. 2015), http://www.Hopkinsmedicine.org/ institutional_ 
review_board/guidelines_policies/guidelines/study_subject_recruitment.html [http://perma.cc/
PJ82-XGLR].  Research institutes and hospitals often recruit human subjects for genomic 
and other medical studies through traditional print advertisements, websites or through
word-of-mouth. See Robert Lins, Clinical Trials: Recruitment Challenges for Proof-of-
Concept Viral Challenge Trials, DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY (Sept. 3, 2014), http://drug­
dev.com/Main/Back-Issues/CLINICAL-TRIALS-Recruitment-Challenges-for-Proofof-748.
aspx [http://perma.cc/XPP9-JVRC]; Deborah F. Tate et al., Recruitment of Young Adults into
a Randomized Controlled Trial of Weight Gain Prevention: Message Development, 
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his ancestry and genetic conditions through the whole genome sequencing 
study. He consented to publishing his genome online on the OpenGenome. 
org website,4 which assured him that it would not post any information 
identifying him with his genome information.5  Xenon was delighted with
the opportunity to contribute his genome information to the scientific 
community and find out more about his genetic makeup and ancestry.  He 
was also excited at the prospect of finding out more potential health
related information, because he did not have access to health insurance. 
He shared his experience in a Facebook post.  Xenon’s genome sequencing 
revealed he has a rare mutation in the ABCD1 gene, which causes X-
linked Adrenoleukodystrophy (X-ALD), a neurological disorder that can
manifest itself late into adulthood.6 
Xenon’s brother, Krypton, did not understand why genomics intrigued 
Xenon. Krypton was a single dad who just wanted to carry on with his 
job and raise his children. He applied to purchase disability insurance as 
a safety net for his children.  The insurance company hired a genome 
Methods, and Cost, 15 TRIALS 326 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC4150977/pdf/13063_2014_Article_2206.pdf [http://perma.cc/C2UA-5SBQ].
4. OpenGenome.org is a hypothetical open-source public genomics project. Actual
open-source public genomics projects include the International HapMap Project, 1000
Genomes, and the Personal Genome Project. See INT’L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ [http://perma.cc/GFE2-BMRN] (last visited July 25, 2015); 1000
GENOMES, http://www.1000genomes.org/ [http://perma.cc/8NCN-9V7Q] (last visited July
25, 2015); PERS. GENOME PROJECT: HARV., http://www.personalgenomes.org [http://perma.
c/9FYT-TAGB] (last visited July 25, 2015). 
5. See infra note 129 for examples of personally identifiable information. 
6. Marc Engelen et al., X-Linked Adrenoleukodystrophy (X-ALD): Clinical 
Presentation and Guidelines for Diagnosis, Follow-Up and Management, 7 ORPHANET J.
RARE DISEASES 51, 1–3 (2012).  X-ALD is a rare genetic disorder that caused by a 
mutation in the ABCD1 gene on the X chromosome.  Id. at 1.  The mutation affects the 
metabolism of lipids. Id. In males, who have one X chromosome, the onset, severity and 
types of symptoms can vary widely. Id. at 2–3. Symptoms can range from childhood
onset cognitive deficits, auditory impairments, and visual impairments that can lead to
death in two to four years, to early onset spastic paraplegia, to slowly progressive myelopathy
(disease of the spinal cord), and to devastating cerebral demyelination (damage to the
myelin sheath of neurons).  Id.  In females, who have two X chromosomes, heterozygous
individuals (individuals with a mutation in one of the two copies of the gene) can be 
asymptomatic, or develop neurological symptoms around the age of sixty years. Id. at 5– 
6. 
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7. There is not a consensus definition of “genome hacking,” as people have used
the terms in various different contexts.  See, e.g., Peter Aldhous & Michael Reilly, Special 
Investigation: How My Genome Was Hacked, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 2009, at 6 (using the 
term “genome hacking” to refer to surreptitious genomic testing without the consent of the 
subject); Damian Counsell, Hacking the Genome, LINUX USER, June 2001, at 26, 28 (using 
the term “genome hacking” to refer to the computational analysis of genomic sequences 
by providing algorithms and computational tools); Erika Check Hayden, Privacy 
Protections: The Genome Hacker, 497 NATURE 172, 173 (2013) (using the term “genome
hacker” to refer to Massachusetts Institute of Technology genomic data scientist Yaniv 
Erlich who revealed some of the risks of genomic data re-identification by uncovering the 
identity of some public genomics participants); Karen Hopkin, Hacking the Genome, THE 
SCIENTIST (June 1, 2012), http://www.the-scientist.com/?articles.view/articleNo/32153/
title/Hacking-the-Genome/ (using the term “genome hacking” to refer to the study of 
evolutionary genetics and genome structure).  Hackers have attacked and accessed private
electronic medical records in the past.  Jennifer Dobner, Fallout Grows from Hacking of 
Utah Health Database, REUTERS (Apr. 9, 2012, 11:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2012/04/10/us-usa-hackers-utah-idUSBRE83904G20120410 [http://perma.cc/9YAF­
8S8C].  For example, in 2012, the Utah Department of Health electronic medical records
were hacked, leading to approximately 500,000 victims having their sensitive personal
information stolen. Id.  Although the term “genome hacking” has not been used to refer
to breach of genomic data or privacy, “genome hacking” or “DNA hacking” would be
appropriate terms to refer to such genomic data security breaches or malicious re-
identification of genomic data.  See David Ewing Duncan, Hacking Your DNA, NEWSWEEK
(Mar. 12, 2014, 12:58 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014/03/21/hacking-your-dna­
247975.html [http://perma.cc/CX6Y-J9X7]. 
8. Insurance companies, during the insurance underwriting process, consider
many basic factors about the applicant to calculate risks, insurance amount, and benefits. 
See, e.g., John H. Dodge & David J. Christianson, Genetic Testing and Disability 
Insurance: An Alternative Opinion, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPP.) 33, 33 (2007). 
Opinions differ as to whether genetic information can be used in underwriting disability
and life insurance.  See, e.g., id. at 33–35; Susan M. Wolf & Jeffrey P. Kahn, Genetic 
Testing and the Future of Insurance: Ethics, Law & Policy, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
(SPECIAL SUPP.) 6, 6 (2007); AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, ISSUE BRIEF: THE USE OF GENETIC
INFORMATION IN DISABILITY INCOME AND LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE (2002), http://www. 
actuary.org/files/publications/genetic_25apr02.pdf [http://perma.cc/9N44-53FT]; MD.
INS. ADMIN., REPORT ON GENETIC INFORMATION AND GENETIC TESTING: INSURANCE AND
PERSONALIZED MEDICINE (2009), http://www.mdinsurance.state.md.us/sa/docs/documents/
home/reports/report-genetictesting1-10.pdf [http://perma.cc/K7NN9RL2]. Although there 
are guidelines about limitations of information gathering during the underwriting process,
public records and medical records are often used in the underwriting process. See, e.g., 
Education Center: Underwriting, AM. INT’L GROUP, http://www.aig.com/underwriting
_3789_536492.html [http://perma.cc/XMV2-T37Y] (last updated Mar. 27, 2014); NAIC
Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Model Act, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS
(Oct. 1992), http://www.naic.org/store/free/ MDL-670.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GC5-WD9L]. 
Recently, a website, called Hacker’s List, opened, that matches professional hackers with
anonymous customers for private hacking service.  Matthew Goldstein, Need Some 
Espionage Done? Hackers Are for Hire Online, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 15, 2015
9:09 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/need-some-espionage-done-hackers-are­
for-hire-online/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/4GD8-CFVU]; HACKER’S LIST, https://hackerslist.com/ 
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hacker re-identified9 Xenon’s genome from OpenGenome.org, noted the
high likelihood Krypton had for developing X-ALD, and reported back to
the insurance company, who denied Krypton’s application.  Years later, 
Krypton’s children received a large bill for Krypton’s care when his 
neurological symptoms from X-ALD started manifesting.
This is a hypothetical, but plausible scenario.10  Recent developments 
in next-generation DNA sequencing11 and cloud-based data sharing services12 
have led to the rapid advancement of genomics,13 including many successful
[https://perma.cc/J7AT-6ZN3] (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).  Although it is unclear whether 
“genome hackers” are currently available for hire, it is conceivable that they may become
available in the future for insurance companies to hire to scrutinize publicly available 
information to re-identify applicants’ information.
9. “Re-identification” refers to the linking the de-identified data (data without any
information that can identify the individual source of the data) to the source of the data.
Bradley Malin & Latanya Sweeney, How (Not) To Protect Genomic Data Privacy in a 
Distributed Network: Using Trail Re-Identification To Evaluate and Design Anonymity 
Protection Systems, 37 J. BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS 179, 180 (2004); Paul Ohm, Broken 
Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 1701, 1703–04 (2009). 
10. In 2013, data scientists successfully re-identified individuals’ data from public 
genomics projects. See Melissa Gymrek et al., Identifying Personal Genomes by Surname 
Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321, 321–24 (2013).  In 2005, a fifteen-year-old boy identified his 
anonymous sperm donor father through Y chromosome genotyping and internet searches. 
Alison Motluk, Anonymous Sperm Donor Traced on Internet, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 3,
2005), http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg18825244.200 [http://perma.cc/S64W-VMK8]. 
See infra Part III.A for discussion of successful re-identification of genetic data.
11. See infra Part II.B for a further discussion of next-generation sequencing. 
12. Cloud-based data sharing services are web-based storage services where users
store and access the data on a host server instead of an individual computer.  Jonathan 
Strickland, How Cloud Computing Works, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuff 
works.com/cloud-computing/cloud-computing.htm [http://perma.cc/GH8P-XDZF] (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2015).  For examples of cloud-based data sharing services for large-scale 
genomic data, see BaseSpace Genomics Cloud Computing, ILLUMINA, https://basespace. 
illumina.com/home/index [https://perma.cc/E995-8YTX] (last visited July 25, 2015)
(providing storage and applications for analysis of genomic sequencing data performed on 
Illumina sequencing platforms); Services for Genomics, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.
amazon.com/health/genomics/services/ [http://perma.cc/J82R-H8VH] (last visited July
25, 2015) (providing storage and tools for analysis of high-throughput genomic data). 
13. Genomics refers to the study of the genome, including whole genome sequencing 
and genome-scale analysis of diseases, such as genome-wide association studies (GWAS).
A Brief Guide to Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome. 
gov/18016863 [http://perma.cc/YAL3-9UPJ] (last updated Apr. 4, 2015); Genome-Wide 
Association Studies, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/20019523
[http://perma.cc/R4UX-TLHS] (last updated Mar. 31, 2015). 
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large-scale genotyping and genome sequencing projects.14  Genomics is a
data-driven discipline of science, and the goal of public and participatory 
genomics projects15 is to make a large amount of genomic sequence data
publicly available and accessible by researchers to foster discoveries.16  In
addition to the reference genome sequenced as part of the initial Human
Genome Project,17 the availability of many more genome-scale data 
significantly contributed to the society’s understanding of human genetics, 
human evolution and migration, and hereditary diseases.18 
Publicly available genomic data often excludes information that can 
identify the subject,19 preserving anonymity and protecting the participant’s
privacy rights.20  However, genomic data inherently contains permanent 
information that is unique to an individual, and scientists have successfully
determined the identity of some individuals whose genomic sequences are 
publicly available.21  This poses unique privacy concerns about publicly 
available genomic information, particularly due to the ease of cross-
referencing other public information, such as information on social media
14. George M. Church, Genomes for All, 294 SCI. AM., Jan. 2006, at 47, 47–48
(2006).  Genotyping generally refers to experiments that determine the genotype (genetic 
information) of an individual.  Genotyping, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.
nih.gov/glossary=genotyping [http://perma.cc/SV9B-WQLC] (last visited July 25, 2015). 
Common large-scale genotyping techniques include single nucleotide polymorphism 
(SNP) arrays and next-generation sequencing. See Ayman Grada & Kate Weinbrecht,
Next-Generation Sequencing: Methodology and Application, 133 J. INVESTIGATIVE
DERMATOLOGY 1, 1–4 (2013); Kevin L. Gunderson et al., A Genome-Wide Scalable SNP 
Genotyping Assay Using Microarray Technology, 37 NATURE GENETICS 549 (2005). 
“Genome sequencing” refers to the determination of how deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
base pairs are organized in a string in the organism’s genome.  See The Human Genome 
Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., 
http://www.genome.gov/11006943 [http://perma.cc/3DBH-BF9E] (last updated Oct. 30, 
2010). For further discussion of genome sequencing projects, see infra Parts II.A and II.B. 
15. “Public genomics projects” refers to genomics projects that recruit a large 
number of participants from the public, and often have the data publicly available.  John 
M. Conley et al., Enabling Responsible Public Genomics, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 330– 
32 (2010). For further discussion of public genomics projects, see infra Part II.B. 
16.  Conley et al., supra note 15, at 330–32. 
17.  See infra Part II.A for a more detailed discussion on the Human Genome Project.
18. See, e.g., Church, supra note 14, at 48; Conley et al., supra note 15, at 333–34; 
About the 1000 Genomes Project, 1000 GENOMES, http://www.1000genomes.org/about 
[http://perma.cc/5WDA-VPDA] (last visited July 3, 2015). 
19. This process is often called “de-identification” of data.  How Can Covered 
Entities Use and Disclose Protected Health Information for Research and Comply with 
the Privacy Rule?, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://privacyruleandresearch.nih.gov/pr 
_08.asp [http://perma.cc/U8QJ-KEXE] (last updated Feb. 2, 2007). 
20. Id. At least in theory, the data should be free of personally identifying
information. Id.; Ohm,  supra note 9, at 1716; PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF
BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 63–65. 
21. This process is often called “re-identification.” See supra note 9. See infra Part 
III.A for further discussion and examples of re-identification. 
756
AHN - PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2015 2:31 PM       
 
    
 





   
  





   
  
   
    
   
 
   
   
  
 









    
 
[VOL. 52:  751, 2015] Whose Genome Is It Anyway? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and ancestry websites.22 Future privacy implications are even more
complex because the full significance and possible implications of the 
genomic information are currently unknown.23  The scientific community 
and administrative agencies24 have actively discussed the problems, needs,
and possible solutions to balance participants’ privacy rights with encouraging 
participation and information availability.25  In 2008, Congress passed the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which prohibits
discrimination based on genetic information in certain situations, to address 
some of the emerging issues from widely available genomic information.26 
Unfortunately, GINA does not provide privacy protection,27 and there is 
currently not a clear solution for the balance.28 
22. Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for Breaching and Protecting 
Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS, 409, 410–11 (2014). 
23. See, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 15, at 344; Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 
22, at 417. 
24. Administrative agencies that participate in and oversee genomic research 
include the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Department of Energy, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Science Foundation, 
and United States Department of Agriculture. Other Federal Agencies Involved in
Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/10003899 [http:// 
perma.cc/J3Z8-Z9XY] (last visited July 25, 2015). 
25. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 1; Bartha Maria Knoppers, Framework for Responsible Sharing of Genomic and 
Health-Related Data, 8 HUGO J. 1, 3 (2014), http://www.thehugojournal.com/content/8/1/3
[http://perma.cc/TL76-RAAF]; Dina Paltoo et al., Commentary, Data Use Under the NIH 
GWAS Data Sharing Policy and Future Directions, 46 NATURE GENETICS 934 (2014); P3G 
Consortium et al., Public Access to Genome-Wide Data: Five Views on Balancing 
Research with Privacy and Protection, 5 PLOS GENETICS e1000665, at 1–4 (2009), http:// 
journals.plos.org/plosgenetics/article?id=10.1371/journal.pgen.1000665 [http://perma.cc/
U5UA-2RSP]; Abdul-Kareem Ahmed, Unhidden Traits: Genomic Data Privacy Debates
Heat Up, SCI. AM. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/unhidden­
traits-genomic-data-privacy-debates-heat-up/ [http://perma.cc/X5NK-D2C3]; Michelle Meyer, 
Online Symposium on the Law, Ethics & Science of Re-identification Demonstrations, 
BILL OF HEALTH, HARV. L. PETRIE-FLOM CTR. (May 13, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
billofhealth/2013/05/13/online-symposium-on-the-law-ethics-science-of-re-identification­
demonstrations/ [http://perma.cc/5MJS-QNBD]; NIH Issues Finalized Policy on Genomic 
Data Sharing, NAT’L INSTS.OF HEALTH (Aug. 27, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.nih. 
gov/news/health/aug2014/od-27.htm [http://perma.cc/ZML4-TLUR]. 
26.  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110­
233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.). 
27. Id.
 28. See supra note 25 for examples of discussion about balancing participant privacy
and scientific information availability.
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This Comment advocates for a comprehensive solution to achieve the 
balance between privacy rights and availability of information.  In particular, 
a strong ban on malicious re-identification and broader anti-discrimination
and privacy legislation are necessary to ensure the participants’ privacy
protection and encourage participation in genomics projects.  In addition, 
the scientific community should establish data standards that can aid in 
implementation of protective measures to minimize privacy violations.29 
Part II provides an overview of recent developments in genomic technologies
and public and participatory genomics.  Part III summarizes the privacy
issues present in public genomics.  Part IV reviews current legislation on 
genetic information and research participation, including their limitations.
Part V proposes a multi-faceted solution, including legislative and research
governance solutions to adequately balance participants’ privacy with 
information availability.




A. Primer on Genetics and Genomics 
The genome is the complete set of genetic information of an organism, 
including the genes and the regions between the genes, stored as 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).30  Any two humans’ genomes are more 
29. This Comment does not address other issues that may be implicated in public 
genomics, such as intellectual property rights, clinical use of research data and secondary
findings, and implication in criminal law, which are reviewed elsewhere. See, e.g., 
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE:
ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL,
RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS 2–19 (2013), http://bioethics.gov/sites/ 
default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z86A-K84R]
(discussing the issue of secondary findings of genomic information); Teneille Brown & 
Kelly Lowenberg, Biobanks, Privacy, and the Subpoena Power, 1 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 
88, 89, 101 (2009) (discussing using genetic data in the context of law enforcement); Jose 
L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome Commons, 
12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 111–18 (discussing intellectual property issues). 
30. NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., NIH PUBLICATION NO. 07-6284, A
GUIDE TO YOUR GENOME 1, 3 (2007), http://www.genome.gov/Pages/Education/AllAboutthe
HumanGenomeProject/GuidetoYourGenome07_vs2.pdf [http://perma.cc/768U-K5J3].  A 
human genome contains approximately 3 billion pairs of nucleotides, organized into
twenty-three pairs of chromosomes and approximately 20,000 protein coding genes. Id. 
at 3–4; Iakes Ezkurdia et al., Multiple Evidence Strands Suggest that There May Be as Few
as 19,000 Human Protein-Coding Genes, 23 HUM. MOLECULAR GENETICS 5866, 5872–73 
(2014); Human Assembly and Gene Annotation, ENSEMBL, http://uswest.ensembl.org/Homo_ 
sapiens/Info/Annotation#assembly [http://perma.cc/X5EU-MRJF] (last visited July 25, 
2015). The nucleus of the cell stores fundamental genetic instructions of an organism in 
DNA form.  NAT’L HUM. GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra at 4–5.  Strings of adenine (A), 
thymine (T), guanine (G), cytosine (C) DNA nucleotides and their complements encode 
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than 99% identical, with the less than 1% difference accounting for the 
expressed physical variations, such as height, hair color, and disease 
state.31  DNA sequencing, the determination of how DNA base pairs are 
organized in a string, is one of the first steps in understanding the relationship 
between the genotype–genetic information—and the phenotype–physical 
expression of the genotype.32 
Early human genetics led to the discovery of classic Mendelian hereditary 
diseases, and DNA sequencing allowed the identification of the actual
causal gene for some of these diseases.33  Many of the most prevalent diseases, 
such as cancer and heart disease, are not classic Mendelian diseases and
involve multiple genetic and environmental factors, making the study of 
genetic components of these diseases difficult.34 
In the past two decades, the discipline of genetics evolved from locating 
individual genes and analyzing their sequences, to sequencing the entire 
genome of an organism, and to understanding the organization and 
the instructions to make the proteins which perform the majority of functions in our bodies. 
Id. at 4.  A gene is an individual organized unit of information that can encode for a protein.
Id. at 4.  A gene can also encode other functional molecules such as a non-coding 
ribonucleic acid (RNA), but the majority of genes encode proteins.  Mark B. Gerstein et 
al., What is a Gene, Post-ENCODE? History and Updated Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 
669 (2007).
31. Lance W. Hahn et al., Multifactor Dimensionality Reduction Software for 
Detecting Gene-Gene and Gene-Environment Interactions, 19 BIOINFORMATICS 376, 376
(2003); International HapMap Project, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www. 
genome.gov/10001688 [http://perma.cc/4SZB-TBJ3] (last updated May 1, 2012). 
32.  NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra note 30, at 3; NCI-NHGRI
Working Grp. on Replication in Ass’n Studies, Replicating Genotype–Phenotype Associations, 
447 NATURE 655, 655 (2007). 
33. Mendelian hereditary diseases, named after the genetic inheritance patterns 
discovered by Gregor Mendel, are caused by a single gene mutation.  Gerstein et al., supra
note 30, at 669–70; Heidi Chial, Mendelian Genetics: Patterns of Inheritance and Single-
Gene Disorders, SCITABLE BY NATURE EDUC., http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/
Mendelian-Genetics-Patterns-of-Inheritance-and-Single-966 [http://perma.cc/26L8-QVYP]
(last visited July 25, 2015).  One example of a disease with Mendelian inheritance disease 
is sickle cell anemia, which occurs due to a single substitution of an A nucleotide with a 
T nucleotide in the ȕ-globin gene.  Allison Ashley-Koch et al., Sickle Hemoglobin (Hb S) 
Allele and Sickle Cell Disease: A HuGE Review, 151 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 839, 839– 
45 (2000).
34. Hahn et al., supra note 31, at 376.  Many common diseases involve a complex 
gene-gene interaction (interaction of multiple genetic factors) and gene-environment
interaction (interaction of genetic factors and environmental factors).  Id.  Epigenetic
factors, which are inherited changes that are not encoded in the DNA, and the environment, 
also contribute to expressed physical variations. Gerstein et al., supra note 30, at 672. 
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interaction between genes within the context of the genome.35  Human 
genetics is a discipline based on statistics, so the availability of a large 
amount of genomic data is crucial to understanding the human genetic 
history and human diseases.36 
B. Public and Participatory Genomics 
The first public genomics project, the Human Genome Project (HGP), 
started in 1990.37  The HGP began as an international scientific research 
consortium, whose participants included the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), the U.S. Department of Energy, and universities and research
institutes around the world.38  At the same time, a parallel sequencing 
project was underway at a private corporation, Celera Genomics.39 The 
HGP and Celera Genomics published two draft reference genomes in
2001,40 and the HGP completed the initial reference human genome in 
35. Frequently Asked Questions About Genetic and Genomic Science, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.gov/19016904 [http://perma.cc/3B3W-XPFX] 
(last updated Feb. 14, 2014). 
36. Genome-Wide Association Studies, supra note 13.  Determination and aggregation 
of phenotypes (physically expressed traits) is also necessary to fully understand the 
implication of the genetic data. Id. Linking the genotypic data to the phenotypic data
allows scientists to determine the association between a specific mutation and a phenotype. 
Id.  An example of these types of studies is genome-wide association studies (GWAS).  Id.
 37. The Human Genome Project Completion: Frequently Asked Questions, supra
note 14. 
38. Id.
 39. COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC & PROTEIN RESEARCH AND
INNOVATION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION,
AND PUBLIC HEALTH 36 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006). Celera 
Genomics was founded as a commercial alternative to generating and commercializing
genomic information. About Us, CELERA, https://www.celera.com/celera/history [https://perma. 
cc/E64H-F9DT] (last visited July 25, 2015).  During the initial genomics era, the HGP and 
Celera were competing to complete the human genome, and Celera’s shotgun approach, 
sequencing shorter fragments and assembling them later, tended to be quicker, and the 
HGP later changed their approach to shotgun sequencing as well. NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra; J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human 
Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1304, 1305–06 (2001), http://www.sciencemag.org/content/291/ 
5507/1304.full.pdf [http://perma.cc/X8AJ-X6RK].
 40. Editorial, E Pluribus Unum, 7 NATURE METHODS 331, 331 (2010). A representative 
sample of five humans were the subjects in the initial draft reference genome.  Int’l Human 
Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome, 
409 NATURE 860, 860 (2001), http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v409/n6822/pdf/ 
409860a0.pdf [http://perma.cc/YR99-FXRW]; Venter et al., supra note 39, at 1305.  The 
draft genome had around 150,000 gaps, including gaps in specific small gap regions that 
are difficult to sequence, such as repeats, in particular structural regions such as centromeres 
and heterochromatic regions, or in regions with high diversity.  Int’l Human Genome
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2003.41  Since the HGP’s completion, DNA genotyping42 and sequencing 
technologies have advanced tremendously, reducing the time and cost of 
obtaining genomic data and increasing the amount of available sequences.43 
One of the earliest genome-scale genotyping technologies that has 
become widely available is single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) 
genotyping.44  SNPs are single base pair differences between individuals’ 
DNA and constitute the small differences between individuals.45  There 
are approximately ten million SNPs in the human genome, occurring 
roughly once every 300 base pairs.46  Although the variations constitute 
less than 1% of the genome, their role as landmarks can help capture most
of the genetic variation between individuals.47  These landmarks are used 
Sequencing Consortium, supra at 874; Venter et al., supra note 39, at 1311; Editorial, 
supra. 
41. International Consortium Completes Human Genome Project: All Goals 
Achieved; New Vision for Genome Research Unveiled, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST. 
(April 14, 2003), https://www.genome.gov/11006929 [https://perma.cc/B9V3-53ZQ].
The initial “completion” of the human reference genome covered approximately 99% of
the human genome (excluding heterochromatic regions), and reduced the number of gaps 
to 341. Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of
the Human Genome, 431 NATURE 931, 931–45 (2004), http://www.nature.com/nature/ 
journal/v431/n7011/pdf/nature03001.pdf [http://perma.cc/3W9U-3ZY8]. Newer builds of
the human reference genome, in which scientists are trying to determine the sequence of
the gaps, continues to be assembled and released.  Vivien Marx, A Star Is Born: the
Updated Human Reference Genome, NATURE METHODS: METHAGORA (Dec. 24, 2013, 
12:19 PM), http://blogs.nature.com/methagora/2013/12/the_updated_human_reference_
genome.html [http://perma.cc/BG2Q-53NA].  A recently released build, Genome Reference
Consortium build 38, included sequences of some of the gaps in the centromere. Id. 
42.  For an explanation of genotyping, see supra note 14. 
43. DNA Sequencing Costs, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www.genome.
gov/sequencingcosts/ [http://perma.cc/2MA5-7VMA] (last updated June 15, 2015). 
44. Ann-Christine Syvänen, Toward Genome-Wide SNP Genotyping, 37 NATURE 
GENETICS S5, S5 (Supp. 2005), http://www.nature.com/ng/journal/v37/n6s/pdf/ng1558.pdf
[http://perma.cc/42B8-UHKB]. Microarray chip-, bead- or sequencing-based genomic
scale SNP genotyping can be used to distinguish SNPs on the genomic scale, up to millions
of SNPs. Id.; Gunderson et al., supra note 14, at 549–54.  For the purposes of this paper,
“public genomics data” include both whole genome sequencing and genomic scale SNP. 
45. What Are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs)?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/snp [http://perma.cc/9L3H-YVBG] (last
visited July 25, 2015). 
46. Id.  SNPs are typically interspersed throughout the genome in protein coding
genes and in regions between them.  Id.
 47. SNP, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/education/glossary/snp [https://
perma.cc/4JWE-C3C2] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).  SNPs can be used as landmarks of 
inheritance because genetic variations that are physically close to each other on the 
chromosome are more likely to be inherited together than variations that are located far
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in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) to identify SNPs that occur 
more frequently in people with a particular physical trait, such as a disease, 
than in people without.48 Inexpensive genome-wide SNP genotyping 
became the basis of direct-to-consumer genomics, with companies such
as 23andMe, deCODE Genetics, Navigenics and Pathway Genomics 
providing SNP genotyping information to private consumers, who pay as 
little as $99 for their ancestry and disease-related information.49 One 
popular direct-to-consumer genomics company, 23andMe, temporarily
suspended providing health-related customer reports, due to Food and
Drug Administration approval problems50 but continues to provide and
apart. Id.  Some of the landmark SNPs can be used to deduce the nearby variations. See
Eric S. Lander, Initial Impact of the Sequencing of the Human Genome, 470 NATURE 187, 
190–91 (2011); What Is the HapMap? INT’L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi. 
nlm.nih.gov/whatishapmap.html.en [http://perma.cc/L7YL-8SAW] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
48. Genome-Wide Association Studies, supra note 13.  For example, in GWAS, SNP 
information (genotype) and phenotype information, such as having a particular disease of
interest, from many individuals are aggregated, to identify regions of the genome that may 
be linked to the phenotype.  Id.  A set of common genetic variants are compared in 
individuals with a condition, such as a disease being studied, and control individuals who
do not have the condition. Id. With a large number of SNPs and sample size, scientists 
can narrow particular genomic regions by the landmark SNPs that may be associated with 
the specific trait. See Lander, supra note 47; Syvänen, supra note 44, at S5. 
49. 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/ [https://perma.cc/5GAE-9BKH] (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015); PATHWAY GENOMICS, https://www.pathway.com/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Q34W-68RP] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015); see Valerie Gutmann Koch, PGTandMe: Social 
Networking-Based Genetic Testing and the Evolving Research Model, 22 HEALTH MATRIX
33, 36–37 (2012) (providing examples of direct-to-consumer genomics companies). 
50. See Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & 
Radiological Health, FDA, to Ann Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), http:// 
www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/2013/ucm376296.htm [http://perma.
cc/G6D8-AJ28].  The FDA recently issued a Warning Letter to 23andMe and other DTS
genomics companies making disease and health-related claims without proper FDA 
approval:
[Y]ou are marketing the 23andMe Saliva Collection Kit and Personal Genome 
Service (PGS) without marketing clearance or approval in violation of the 
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act).  This product is a device 
within the meaning of section 201(h) of the FD&C Act, 21 U.S.C. 321(h), 
because it is intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or
in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or is intended to
affect the structure or function of the body.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006)). After the warning, 23andMe has temporarily
discontinued providing reports regarding health related information, but FDA subsequently
issued authorization to provide reports for one disease.  Status of Our Health-Related
Genetic Reports, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/health/ [https://perma.cc/J3NE­
C3EP] (last visited June 28, 2015) (“In February, 2015, 23andMe was granted authorization by
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to market the Bloom syndrome carrier 
status report. This is an important first step in fulfilling our commitment to return genetic 
health reports to consumers. . . . At this time, we do not know which health reports might 
be available or when they might be available.”). See also, infra note 51. 
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store ancestry information.51 
Biotechnology companies such as Illumina, Life Technologies, and 
Roche developed several sequencing technology platforms, collectively
termed next-generation sequencing technologies, which significantly 
increased the amount of sequence data output for human genetics.52  Next-
generation sequencing typically uses shorter read lengths,53 but uses a 
substantially higher number of overlapping reads to assemble the sequences
computationally.54  This exponentially lowered the cost and time required 
to read large stretches of DNA, from approximately $20 per base pair in 
199055 to less than $0.10 per million base pairs in 2014.56  In 2012, the
average cost of whole genome sequencing of a human-sized genome– 
three billion base pairs was less than $10,000,57 making the $1,000 genome
within reach.58
 51. Bring Your Ancestry to Life Through Your DNA, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.
com/ancestry/ [https://perma.cc/3LJE-7KVL] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).  23andMe since 
has submitted one disease-related marker test for FDA approval, and was granted an
approval.  Robert Hof, Seven Months After FDA Slapdown, 23andMe Returns with New
Health Report Submission, FORBES (June 20, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/roberthof/2014/06/20/seven-months-after-fda-slapdown-23andme-returns-with-new- 
health-report-submission [http://perma.cc/6UW9-SV8S]; Status of Our Health-Related
Genetic Reports, supra note 50. However, 23andMe currently only provides ancestry
reports and uninterpreted raw genetic data without health related information.  Id.
 52. Grada & Weinbrecht, supra note 14, at 1–2; see Elaine R. Mardis, The Impact 
of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology on Genetics, 24 TRENDS GENETICS 133, 133– 
35 (2008) (surveying Roche’s and Illumina’s next-generation instruments). 
53. Read length is the length of DNA that can be read at once.  Rob Carlson, How 
Competition Improves DNA Sequencing, SYNTHESIS (Apr. 23, 2013, 2:36 PM), http://www.
synthesis.cc/2013/04/how-competition-improves-reading-dna.html [http://perma.cc/S8SL- 
LUBX].
54. See Grada & Weinbrecht, supra note 14, at 1, 2.
 55. Rob Carlson, Time for New DNA Synthesis and Sequencing Cost Curves, 
SYNTHESIS (Feb. 12, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.synthesis.cc/2014/02/time-for-new-cost-
curves-2014.html [http://perma.cc/UJ5U-G9PJ].
56. DNA Sequencing Costs, supra note 43. 
57. This estimate accounts for additional direct and indirect costs and increased 
coverage requirements for long reads. Id. See also The Human Genome Project Completion:
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 14. 
58. Church, supra note 14, at 47–48. “$1,000 genome” became a symbolic goal in 
DNA sequencing technology.  Id.  The goal is to make DNA sequencing so affordable that 
individuals and their doctors can easily use sequence information to understand variations 
and make healthcare decisions.  See id.  Currently, direct-to-consumer whole genome
sequencing is available from one company, Gene by Gene, at a price of $10,395. GENE
BY GENE, supra note 2.
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Several large-scale public genomics projects emerged, backed by the 
increasing availability of large scale data and the growing popularity of 
direct-to-consumer genomics.59  As more genomic data become available, 
the research community seeks access to the already sequenced genomes,
to maximize the utility of existing data.60  Increasing genome-scale DNA 
data accessibility can augment the statistical power necessary to understand
the link between genetic variations and phenotypes.61 
Public genomics projects and initiatives are international collaborative 
efforts to collect genome-scale information and the phenotypic information 
needed to elucidate the complex interplay between the genetic and 
environmental components of phenotypes.62  These initiatives allow
comparison of sequencing results completed around the world and maximize 
the obtained data’s utility by allowing other researchers to mine the genomic 
data for additional connections to physical traits.63  The International HapMap 
project, one of the earlier international consortia, publicly released genome- 
scale haplotype maps from SNP genotyping of different populations 
throughout the world.64  The 1000 Genomes project, built upon the
International HapMap project, aims to make whole genome sequencing
data from about 2,500 individuals from twenty-five populations publicly
 59. See supra note 4. 
60. See Church, supra note 14.  A comparison of many genotypes and phenotypes 
is necessary to understand how certain genes function. NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH 
INST., supra note 13.  The focus of genetics has moved from small scale approaches to a 
larger scale “systems” approach, making experiments much more expensive to perform. 
See Church, supra note 14; NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST., supra note 13. Since 
whole genome sequencing and other techniques generate data that can be mined for 
additional purposes, making this data accessible to a wider population can help maximize 
the utility of the data, especially in the era of much more competitive and diminishing
science research funding. See, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 15; Pak C. Sham & Shaun 
M. Purcell, Statistical Power and Significance Testing in Large-Scale Genetic Studies, 15 
NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 335 passim (2014); Frequently Asked Questions: Data 
Sharing, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/data_sharing/data_ 
sharing_faqs.htm [http://perma.cc/H4G5-CFHZ] (last revised Feb. 16, 2004). 
61. See Sham & Purcell, supra note 60. Typically, for complex genetic traits, a 
large sample size is required to achieve a statistically significant association between a 
genotype and a phenotype. See id.  Making previously obtained data available allows 
scientists to use the data to increase sample size and obtain the statistical power necessary
for significant associations. See id. Public and open-sourced genomics projects contributed to
a significant increase in the availability of genomic and phenotypic data necessary for 
statistical analysis in human genetics.  Conley et al., supra note 15; Lander, supra note 47. 
62. See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 330–35. 
63. See id.; Jeanne Erdmann, As Personal Genomes Join Big Data Will Privacy and
Access Shrink?, 20 CHEMISTRY & BIOLOGY 1, 1–2 (2013); Sham & Purcell, supra note 60; 
Frequently Asked Questions: Data Sharing, supra note 60. 
64. About the HapMap, INT’L HAPMAP PROJECT, http://hapmap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
thehapmap.html.en [http://perma.cc/PPS3-DB5E] (last visited Apr. 12, 2015). 
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available for the researchers worldwide to use.65  The result of its pilot
project are available as a public data set.66  The Personal Genome Project 
(PGP) is a project that requests participants to make their genomic data 
openly available.67 
Popularity of direct-to-consumer genomics also led to the launch of 
crowd-sourced genomics projects.68  Often called participatory genomics, 
these projects use Internet databases to identify research populations,
recruit participants, and collect genomic data.69  One such project, openSNP, 
65. 1000 GENOMES, supra note 4. See also About the 1000 Genomes Project, supra
note 18. 
66. See 1000 GENOMES, supra note 4. The data set is available via Amazon Web 
Services.  1000 Genomes Project and AWS, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon. 
com/1000genomes/ [http://perma.cc/3G6B-4UGV] (last visited July 25, 2015). 
67. PERS. GENOME PROJECT: HARV., supra note 4. The PGP accepts both whole
genome sequencing and SNP-based data. See Data & Samples, PERS. GENOME PROJECT:
HARV., http://www.personalgenomes.org/harvard/data [http://perma.cc/3Y2P-EV48] (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2015).
68. See, e.g., Firas Khatib et al., Crystal Structure of a Monomeric Retroviral 
Protease Solved by Protein Folding Game Players, 18 NATURE STRUCTURAL &
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1175, 1175 (2011); Robert M. Plenge et al., Crowdsourcing Genetic 
Prediction of Clinical Utility in the Rheumatoid Arthritis Responder Challenge, 45 
NATURE GENETICS 468, 468 (2013); Melanie Swan, Crowd-sourced Health Research
Studies: An Important Emerging Complement to Clinical Trials in the Public Health
Research Ecosystem, 14 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e46 passim (2012); Is Crowdsourcing the 
Future of Scientific Research?,  MICH. ST. U. (May 15, 2014), http://msutoday.msu.edu/ 
news/2014/is-crowdsourcing-the-future-of-scientific-research/ [http://perma.cc/SP6R-RVPL].
“Crowd-sourced studies” refers to studies that use “a large, often varied or undefined 
group or population to undertake a defined task.”  Dan Vorhaus, Crowd-Sourcing vs. 
Open-Sourcing in Consumer Genomics, GENOMICS L. REP. (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www. 
genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2009/08/25/crowd-sourcing-vs-open-sourcing-in-consumer- 
genomics/ [http://perma.cc/Z4K3-3EJ2]. For genomic research, crowd-sourcing may involve
“using web-driven or other distributed modes of interaction to identify research populations,
recruit participants and, ultimately, collect the data necessary to produce meaningful 
scientific research.” Id.
69. For example, consumers who have data from direct-to-consumer services can
upload their data to these projects. Vorhaus, supra note 68.  For other examples of crowd-
sourced genomics or medical projects, see DIYGENOMICS, http://www.diygenomics.org/
[http://perma.cc/57KD-4M74] (last visited July 25, 2015); GENOMERA, http://genomera. 
com/ [http://perma.cc/HS32-KKUH] (last visited July 25, 2015); OPENSNP, https:// 
opensnp.org/ [https://perma.cc/9EJH-QPCM] (last visited July 25, 2015); PATIENTS
LIKEME, http://www.patientslikeme.com/ [http://perma.cc/RHC6-8DVS] (last visited July
25, 2015); QUANTIFIED SELF, http://quantifiedself.com/ [http://perma.cc/V3VG-F69D]
(last visited July 25, 2015).  Some participatory genomics or medical projects have already
produced results. See, e.g., Adam A. Margolin et al., Systematic Analysis of Challenge-
Driven Improvements in Molecular Prognostic Models for Breast Cancer, 5 SCI.
TRANSLATIONAL MED. 181re1, 1–2 (2013) (reporting that a crowd-sourced genomic data 
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encourages direct-to-consumer genomics consumers to publish their test
results for both scientific research and to obtain additional information.70 
For example, participants can find others with similar genetic variations
and access scientific literature about their genotypes.71 
DNA-based ancestry tracing is also popular.72  Some of the DNA-based 
genealogy companies provide family finder databases that can assist in 
locating relatives and building a family tree.73  Once considered a hobby 
for a select group, genealogy became a fast-growing industry, aided by direct- 
to-consumer genomics and public genealogy databases.74  Searchable public
DNA-based genealogy databases provide a significant expansion of 
public genealogical information, in addition to the numerous non-DNA 
based genealogy sites readily accessible by the public.75 
III. PRIVACY ISSUES IN PUBLIC AND PARTICIPATORY GENOMICS
A. Re-identification: Cracking Anonymized Data 
Even though most public genomics projects exclude identifiable
information from genomic data, the risk of privacy breach by re-identification 
analysis challenge by Sage Bionetworks resulted in a more accurate prognostic model for
breast cancer outcomes.) 
70. See, e.g., Bastian Greshake et al., openSNP–A Crowd-sourced Web Resource 
for Personal Genomics, 9 PLOS ONE e89204 (2014), http://www.plosone.org/article/
fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0089204&representation=PDF[http:// 
perma.cc/XB58-36JV]; OPENSNP, supra note 69. 
71. Greshake et al., supra note 70; OPENSNP, supra note 69. In this sense, openSNP 
is both an open-source and crowd-sourced project.  Id.; Vorhaus, supra note 68. 
72. See infra note 74. 
73. ANCESTRYDNA, http://dna.ancestry.com/ [http://perma.cc/5NQY-YFNN] (last
visited July 27, 2015); FAM. TREE DNA, https://www.familytreedna.com/ [https://perma. 
cc/5S2V-FWVW] (last visited July 27, 2015); 23ANDME, supra note 49. 
74. Alan Farnham, Who’s Your Daddy? Genealogy Becomes $1.6B Hobby, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/genealogy-hot-hobby-worth-16b­
mormons/story?id=17544242 [http://perma.cc/FH5B-6P83]; Gregory Rodriguez, How 
Genealogy Became Almost as Popular as Porn, TIME.COM (May 30, 2014), http://time.
com/133811/how-genealogy-became-almost-as-popular-as-porn/ [http://perma.cc/5U2P­
9N5X].  Although certain cultures or religious groups have considered genealogy to be 
important in the past, genealogy was typically limited to those groups or some hobbyists
before the advent of the internet in the 1990s.  Rodriguez, supra. The current popularity
of genealogy is exemplified by the fact that Ancestry.com, a popular genealogy service 
website, had over 2 million paid subscribers and approximately a billion dollars in revenue 
for 2012. Farnham, supra.
 75. See, e.g., infra note 85. See also Top 100 Genealogy Websites for 2014, 
GENEALOGYINTIME MAG., http://www.genealogyintime.com/articles/top-100-genealogy­
websites-of-2014-page02.html [http://perma.cc/L5WS-DMPZ] (last visited July 27, 2015)
(listing the top 100 most frequently visited genealogy websites in 2014). 
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still remains.76  Re-identification studies revealed the privacy risk of public
medical information.77  In 1997, Latanya Sweeney, then a computer science 
graduate student, was able to identify the health record of the then 
Massachusetts governor William Weld.78  Health records publicly released 
by Massachusetts contained the birthdate, sex, and zip code of the patients.79 
Although the governor was a well-known figure with a publicized
hospitalization, which likely made re-identification easier,80 Sweeney and 
others’ subsequent research showed that an individual can be uniquely
identified with relatively few items of information.81  Re-identification 
research highlighted the privacy risk of public information containing 
personally identifying information, influencing the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule.82 
Genome scientists at MIT recently published a prominent example of 
re-identification from publicly available genomic data.83  They cross-
referenced Y chromosome data from public genomics projects to public, 
searchable surname-based genealogy databases that also allow users to 
enter Y chromosome data.84  They uniquely identified the surnames of 
some of the individuals, and in five out of the ten genomes with the most 
complete Y chromosome data, they successfully identified the individuals 
76. Russ B. Altman et al., Data Re-identification: Societal Safeguards, 339 
SCIENCE 1032, 1032–33 (2013).  See also supra note 9. 
77. See, e.g., Gymrek et al., supra note 10; Jonathan Shaw, Exposed: The Erosion 
of Privacy in the Internet Era, HARV. MAG., Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 39–40; Latanya Sweeney, 
k-anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 INT’L J. UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS &
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS 557, 557 (2002). 
78. Sweeney, supra note 77, at 559. 
79. Id. at 558–59.
80. Daniel C. Barth-Jones, The “Re-identification” of Governor William Weld’s
Medical Information: A Critical Re-examination of Health Data Identification Risks and 
Privacy Protections, Then and Now (July 24, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2076397 [http://perma.cc/RWH4-2BFJ]. 
81. See, e.g., Malin & Sweeney, supra note 9.
 82. Ohm, supra note 9, at 1737; Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012).  Sweeney’s research influenced
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, to limit birth dates only to years and ZIP code only to the first
three digits, or the first two digits for ZIP codes with populations 20,000 or less. Ohm,
supra note 9, at 1737; 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2). 
83.  Gymrek et al., supra note 10. 
84. Gymrek et al., supra note 10, at 321–22.  The scientists used publicly available 
whole genome sequencing data to infer the genotype of short repeated sequences in the Y
chromosome that can serve as a hereditary fingerprint.  Id. at 321.
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and their families.85  This study demonstrated that identification of an 
individual based on purely public information is possible with relative 
ease.86  De-identification of genomic information by removing HIPAA 
identifiers does not guarantee the removal of all identifiable information 
because information inherent in the DNA can be retrieved by relatively 
simple processing.87  In addition, the amount of data an adversary88 can 
potentially access increases as people voluntarily make increasingly more
personal information available online.89 
B. Risk of Privacy Breach for Family and Relatives 
Because genes are inherited, there is an additional privacy risk to close 
relatives of individuals with publicly available genomic information.90  In
2013, scientists briefly published online the genome of Henrietta Lacks, 
85. Gymrek et al., supra note 10, at 323.  They used Y chromosome genotyping 
data available on the genealogy websites.  Id.; YSEARCH, http://www.ysearch.org/ [http:// 
perma.cc/5EGT-UQ46] (last visited July 27, 2015) (providing free public search based on 
Y chromosome genotyping data by FamilyTreeDNA). 
86. Gymrek et al., supra note 10.  Each complete pedigree identification took 3 to 
7 hours by a trained individual.  Id. at 323.  Although the success rate was not high and
this specific technique can only be used to identify males, the study demonstrated the 
proof-of-principle that re-identification is easily possible for persons without a highly
public profile. Id. 
87. Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to Protect Health Privacy in 
Research?, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 5–6 (2010). 
88. In data science and data security, an adversary is “an individual, group, organization,
or government that conducts or has the intent to conduct detrimental activities.” Explore 
Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology, NAT’L INITIATIVE FOR
CYBERSECURITY CAREERS & STUD., DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, http://niccs.us-cert.gov/
glossary#adversary [http://perma.cc/A3CT-YR94] (last visited Jan. 17, 2015).  In this context,
detrimental activities can refer to an attack on the privacy of persons whose data is stored 
electronically.  Tim Matthews, Anatomy of a Data Breach, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY
PROF’LS (2011), https://www.privacyassociation.org/media/presentations/12Summit/S12_
Anatomy_of_a_Data_Breach_PPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7BW-GXYV]. For example,
an adversary can cause a security breach by accessing data that they should not have access 
to. Id.  In other cases, the adversary can cause a privacy breach by re-identifying publicly
available information.  Ohm, supra note 9, at 1707–08.  Data security scientists often taken
on the role as adversaries to examine the risk of these breaches.  See, e.g., Arvind
Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-Anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2008 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY & PRIVACY 111 (2008); 
Gymrek et al., supra note 10. 
89. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 411.  For example, people voluntarily
submit and make available their personal information in many social networking sites. Id.
 90. See, e.g., Mathias Humbert et al., Addressing the Concerns of the Lacks Family:
Quantification of Kin Genomic Privacy, in  PROCEEDINGS OF 2013 ACM SIGSAC
CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY 1141 (2013).  For example, 
significant parts of a person’s genome can be deduced from a close relative’s genome. 
Christopher A. Cassa et al., My Sister’s Keeper?: Genomic Research and the Identifiability 
of Siblings, 1 BMC MED. GENOMICS 32, 32 (2008). 
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the woman from whom the widely used HeLa cell lines91 originated, 
without the consent of her relatives.92  The widely publicized case highlighted
another important aspect of privacy in public genomics: a public genome 
can reveal information about the participant’s relatives.93  Although the
scientists took the data off-line soon thereafter, at least fifteen people had
already downloaded it and one was able to upload it onto a website called 
SNPedia to obtain a literature summary report about Henrietta Lacks and 
her family.94 
Similar re-identification issues can also often surface in the form of 
family issues, such as paternity.95  For example, in 2005, a 15-year-old 
boy was able to identify his anonymous sperm donor father by genotyping 
of his own Y chromosome and accessing paid online databases of birthplaces 
and birthdates.96  The boy identified his biological father without access
to the father’s genotype, through publicly available genotypes of his 
potential biological male relatives.97 
91. HeLa cells are one of the most widely used isolated cultured human cell lines
in biological research.  Rebecca Skloot, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, the Sequel, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/24/opinion/sunday/the­
immortal-life-of-henrietta-lacks-the-sequel.html [http://perma.cc/V5JF-F2CC].  The name
comes from the first two letters of Henrietta Lacks’ first and last names.  Wynne Parry,
Controversial ‘Hela’ Cells: Use Restricted Under New Plan, LIVESCIENCE (Aug. 07, 2013,
12:57 PM) http://www.livescience.com/38728-hela-cells-restricted-new-nih-plan.html [http:// 
perma.cc/3M6E-FVVY].
92. Skloot, supra note 91.  Ms. Lacks died in 1951 and was unable to personally
provide consent.  Id. Although some of her relatives became known to the public in the 
recent years, they did not provide consent to publishing Ms. Lacks’s genome. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. Id.  SNPedia is a wiki website that collects information about different SNP 
variants and information related to the SNPs.  SNPEDIA, http://www.snpedia.com/index.
php/SNPedia [http://perma.cc/DD2A-TGJT] (last modified June 10, 2015).  Uploading
data onto SNPedia allows the generation of a literature summary report, called Promethease
that generates a scientific literature report associated with the collection of SNPs that were
entered. Promethease, SNPEDIA, http://www.snpedia.com/index.php/Promethease [http://perma.
cc/WRA2-JE5A] (last modified Aug. 18, 2015); Skloot, supra note 91. 
95. See, e.g., Motluk, supra note 10 (describing the steps a 15-year-old boy took to 
identify his anonymous sperm donor father); George Doe, With Genetic Testing, I Gave 
My Parents the Gift of Divorce, VOX (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:50 AM), http://www.vox.com/ 
2014/9/9/5975653/with-genetic-testing-i-gave-my-parents-the-gift-of-divorce-23andme 
[http://perma.cc/C2DE-2RGL] (recounting a story of a man who, by searching the 23 
andMe close relative finder program using his SNP genotyping data, identified that he had 
a half-brother that no one knew about, which eventually led to his parents’ divorce). 
96. Motluk, supra note 10. 
97. Motluk, supra note 10.  The boy found two potential brothers who did not know 
each other but had the same last name, through the Y chromosome genotyping. Id. The 
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In addition, specific disease risks of an individual can be calculated 
based on the risks of relatives with public genomic information.98  In another
study, scientists were able to estimate the decrease in genetic privacy for 
relatives of individuals who shared their data on openSNP.99  They cross-
referenced Facebook to identify the relatives of individuals who contributed 
to openSNP to theoretically estimate the risk of each relative having
genotypes associated with Alzheimer’s disease.100 
The HeLa genome controversy, successful paternity tracing, and the 
disease risk calculations of relatives reveal potential privacy risks to relatives
of public genomics participants.101  With more genomic and other personal
information available to the public, adversaries may be able to assess disease 
risks of the participants’ relatives, regardless of their own participation in
public genomics, as in the case of Krypton and Xenon presented in the 
beginning of the Comment.102 
C. Consent for Future Studies and Discoveries 
Genomics advanced rapidly in the past twenty years, and developments 
and discoveries remain ongoing.103  Due to the evolving nature of future
discoveries, the issue of consent for future studies or developments also
poses a problem for public genomics.104  For example, additional future
boy’s mother knew the donor’s birthdate and place of birth.  Id.  By accessing a database 
that contained the list of persons born on that date in that city, the boy was able to identify
his donor from the last name shared with the potential brothers.  Id.  The boy contacted his 
donor father within 10 days. Id.
 98. See Humbert supra note 90. This is an example of how Krypton’s risks for X­
ALD could be calculated based on Xenon’s information that is publicly available. See
supra Part I. 
99. Humbert supra note 90. See supra note 70, at 6, for a discussion of openSNP. 
100. Humbert supra note 90, at 1141, 1149.  The scientists estimated the level of 
uncertainty for each of the relatives having two SNPs that are known to significantly
increase an individual’s probability of having Alzheimer’s by the age of eighty, based on 
the published SNP genotyping data. Id. at 1150.
 101. Humbert supra note 90. 
102. See supra Part I. 
103. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 
1, at 19.  For example, the relationship between a gene and a specific mutation to the 
expressed physical characteristics (phenotype) is only clearly elucidated for some genes, 
such as for mutations involved diseases that are inherited in clear Mendelian manner. See
id.  Rare variants that were not picked up by SNP-based GWAS are being uncovered by
whole genome sequencing, but the implication of these variants on diseases are not all 
known. Elizabeth T. Cirulli & David B. Goldstein, Uncovering the Roles of Rare Variants 
in Common Disease Through Whole Genome Sequencing, 11 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS
415, 415 (2010).  Having a large number of available whole genome sequencing data, will 
facilitate discoveries of rare variants and their effects on diseases.  See id. at 415–16. 
104. See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 329; Jeantine E. Lunshof et al., From Genetic 
Privacy to Open Consent, 9 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 406, 408–09 (2008). 
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studies may show a link between initially neutral data and negative 
outcomes.105  Because genomic information is permanent, future negative
implications cannot be detached from the genomic information once it is 
discovered.106  This problem is worse in public genomics because publicly
released data cannot be retracted.107  The initial public release is typically 
voluntary and presumably with informed consent.108  However, scientists
cannot fully inform the participants of all future developments, risks and 
implications.109 
Another complication that may arise from public genomic information 
is consent for the use of the information in additional future studies.110 
The participants initially contribute the genomic data for a specific 
purpose such as data gathering for a public genomics project or a GWAS 
for a particular disease.111  To maximize the utility of the gathered
information, the data may be used in future studies.112  Regulatory agencies 
have not agreed on rules to address the consent issue for these additional 
105. See Euan A. Ashley et al., Genetics and Cardiovascular Disease: A Policy 
Statement from the American Heart Association, 126 CIRCULATION 142, 149 (2012).  For
example, someone who participated in a public genomics project may have a mutation that 
is not currently associated with any diseases. See id.  In time, scientists may discover that
this mutation is associated with high risk of a disease and could be considered a negative 
factor in obtaining life insurance. See id.  In this case, the subject’s initial consent to the
study may not have been completely “informed.” See id.; PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 48. 
106. See Erman Ayday et al., The Chills and Thrills of Whole Genome Sequencing, 
ARXIV:1306.1264v4, at 5–6 (2013), http://arxiv.org/pdf/1306.1264v5.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/YB7F-FL53].  This problem is less evident in other human subject studies, because the 
genomic data contains uniquely identifying information and a significant proportion of 
unassociated data is released without fully understanding the implication. See id. Another 
issue is that because genomic information is permanent and cannot be changed like other
information such as bank account numbers and passwords, the information is not retractable.
See id.
 107. See Brett A. Williams & Leslie E. Wolf, Biobanking, Consent, and Certificates 
of Confidentiality: Does the ANPRM Muddy the Water?, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 440, 448– 
49 (2013).
108. See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 351. 
109. See id.
 110. See Charles Safran et al., Toward a National Framework for the Secondary Use
of Health Data: An American Medical Informatics Association White Paper, 14 J. AM.
MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 1, 2 (2006); See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 354–56. 
111. See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 354–56.  For a brief explanation of GWAS,
see supra note 48. 
112. See Jane Kaye et al., From Patients to Partners: Participant-Centric Initiatives 
in Biomedical Research, 13 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 371, 372 (2012) (explaining that 
the data can be used in a GWAS for different diseases). 
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studies.113  Under the current regulation of the Common Rule and HIPAA, 
research with de-identified information does not require updated consent 
or notice.114  Consent issues for publicly available genomic information 
must be reevaluated, as the public typically does not distinguish between 
identifiable and de-identified data, but does want to control the use of the 
information.115  Obtaining updated, informed consent is difficult and 
expensive, and current requirements do not cover publicly available de­
identified information, so a new mechanism to easily obtain additional or 
renewed consent is needed.116 
D. Difficulties in Uniform Guidelines and International Enforcement 
Another obstacle in considering the privacy issues of publicly available 
genomic information is that the projects and consortia are typically of
international scale, and there is no single law or regulation that governs 
these projects or potential privacy breaches.117  Each of the projects or 
consortia sets its own guidelines, and relies on the researchers using the 
data to abide by the data use guidelines.118  Countries also have different 
privacy standards regarding health-related information.119  Even if the  
researchers abide by the guidelines, once the data is publicly available, it 
becomes much more difficult to control or retract.120 
IV. CURRENT LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LIMITATIONS
There are multiple laws and regulations potentially affecting public
genomics and privacy.121  As seen with other rapidly developing technological
 113. See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 355; See  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE 
STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 75. 
114. See Rothstein, supra note 87, at 8; see infra Part IV.A for a more detailed
discussion of HIPAA, and Part IV.C for a more detailed discussion of the Common Rule. 
115. See Donald J. Willison et al., Patients’ Consent Preferences for Research Uses 
of Information in Electronic Medical Records: Interview and Survey Data, 326 BMJ 373,
374 (2003).
116. See Conley et al., supra note 15, at 351–52. 
117. GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR GENOMICS & HEALTH, CREATING A GLOBAL ALLIANCE
TO ENABLE RESPONSIBLE SHARING OF GENOMIC AND CLINICAL DATA 12 (2013), http:// 
genomicsandhealth.org/files/public/White%20Paper%20June%203%20final_0.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/W73N-3SFR] [hereinafter RESPONSIBLE SHARING]; see PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N 
FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 65. 
118. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 25. 
119. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
65. 
120. Ayday et al., supra note 106, at 5. 
121. See generally  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
supra note 1, at 60–69.  The scope of the legislations and regulations does not encompass 
all of the issues of public genomics. Id. at 68–69. 
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areas, laws and regulations regarding genomic privacy can lag behind the 
speed of development of the technology and currently do not sufficiently 
protect participants from potential misuse of information.122 
A. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is one of 
the earliest pieces of legislation encompassing medical information 
privacy.123  Pursuant to the authority of Title II, HIPAA sets forth policies, 
procedures, and guidelines for maintaining the privacy and security 
of personally identifiable health information.124  The HIPAA-mandated 
Privacy Rule125 governs whether a covered entity, such as a healthcare
provider or a health plan, can or cannot disclose patient-identifiable 
information, such as name, address and social security number.126 
Under HIPAA, two methods can be used to achieve de-identification of
medical information.127  First, an expert can determine that the risk of re-
identification of individual is “very small,” rendering the information
unidentifiable.128  Second, the information can become “de-identified” by 
122.  Conley et al., supra note 15, at 338–40. 
123. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
61–62. 
124. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 
U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.).  HIPAA was enacted August 21, 1996. Id.
125. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, 45
C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a), 164.514(b) (2014).  In 2013, the Privacy Rule was updated to 
integrate changes under “the [Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health (HITECH)] Act, enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA).”  Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., New Rule Protects Patient Privacy, 
Secures Health Information (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/01/ 
20130117b.html [http://perma.cc/H8P9-FNL6]. 
126.  45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
127. Id. § 164.514(b) (2014). 
128. Id. (“[An expert is] a person with appropriate knowledge of and experience with
generally accepted statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering information 
not individually identifiable: (i) applying such principles and methods, determines that the 
risk is very small that the information could be used, alone or in combination with other 
reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to identify an individual who 
is a subject of the information; and (ii) documents the methods and results of the analysis
that justify such determination.”) (emphasis added). 
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removing HIPAA identifiers.129 Furthermore, a covered entity can disclose
information only if “the recipient signs a data use agreement indicating 
that the information will be used only for limited purposes.”130  In Baser
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan denied the Department of Veterans Affairs’ motion
for summary judgment for refusing to provide information under the 
Freedom of Information Act, even though the Department of Veterans 
Affairs provided expert opinion analyzing the risk of re-identification 
when linked with other publicly available or commercially available 
databases.131  The court stated that under HIPAA, the information is “de­
identified” if it uses either one of the two methods, “expert determination” 
or removal of the eighteen HIPAA identifiers, but does not require both 
methods.132 
Courts have reviewed the risk of re-identification of personal medical 
information in a handful of cases under the HIPAA Privacy Rule.133  In
the limited number of cases from different jurisdictions, courts differ on
their assessment of re-identification risk in medical information for public
release or for discovery purposes.134  In some of the cases, courts
acknowledged the risk of re-identification and the invasion of privacy.135 
In Northwestern Memorial Hospital v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit Court 
concluded that the hospital’s production of forty-five subpoenaed medical 
records would breach the privacy interests of the patients.136  The court
balanced the benefits and burdens of producing the subpoenaed record, 
including the risk of re-identification.137  The court stated that even with 
the HIPAA identifiers removed, the patients’ acquaintances or “skillful
 129. Id. §§ 160.103, 164.514.  HIPAA identifiers include names; address; dates; 
phone numbers; fax numbers; email addresses; social security numbers; medical record 
numbers; health plan beneficiary; numbers; account numbers; certificate/license numbers; 
vehicle identifiers; device identifiers and serial; numbers; web URLs; internet protocol 
(IP) addresses; biometric identifiers, including; finger and voice prints; full face photographic
images; and any comparable images; any other unique identifying; number, characteristic,
or code, (with certain exceptions). Id. §§ 160.103, 164.514(b) (2014). 
130. Rothstein, supra note 87, at 4 (citing 45 C.F.R. §164.514(e)(4)). 
131. Baser v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 13-CV-12591, 2014 WL 4897290, at
*4, *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2014). 
132. Id. at *4–5. 
133. See, e.g., Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 924–26 (7th Cir. 2004); 
Baser, 2014 WL 4897290, at *4–5; Havemann v. Astrue, No. ELH-10-1498, 2012 WL 
4378143 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2012); Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2d 331, 
338–39 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Cohan v. Ayabe, 322 P.3d 948, 957–59 (Haw. 2014). 
134. See cases cited supra note 133. 
135. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 929; Havemann, 2012 WL 4378143, at *1; 
Cohan, 322 P.3d at 950. 
136. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 362 F.3d at 929. 
137. Id.
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Googlers” can re-identify the patients from the released data and can
invade the patient’s privacy.138  Similarly, in Havemann v. Astrue, the U.S.
District Court in Maryland granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Social Security Administration, who produced de-identified medical
records under the Freedom of Information Act.139  The plaintiff sought 
injunctive relief for the release of the full records, but the court reasoned 
that further release of information can lead to re-identification and 
violation of the privacy of individuals who are included in the record.140 
In contrast, other courts dismissed the re-identification risk and considered
the information to be sufficiently de-identified if the data is free of HIPAA 
identifiers.141 In Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corporation, the court
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that information de-identified according 
to HIPAA standards can be re-identified.142 The court rejected the argument 
because the plaintiff only provided an academic journal article explaining 
the general risk of re-identification, but not any actual expert analysis of 
the data from the case.143 
In general, few courts have determined that the risk of re-identification 
of medical data is significant, and many consider that removal of the
eighteen HIPAA identifiers is sufficient for privacy protection.144  However, 
the approach requires a revisit in the context of genomic information, as 
genomic data contains inherently identifiable information that is permanent.145 
B. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 
Unlike HIPAA, which provides some privacy protection, the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) provides protection against 
discrimination based on genetic information in health insurance and
employment.146  Under GINA, health insurers cannot: (1) use genetic
 138. Id.
139. Havemann v. Astrue, No. ELH-10-1498, 2012 WL 4378143, at *7–9 (D. Md. 
Sept. 24, 2012). 
140. Id.
141. Baser v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 13-CV-12591, 2014 WL 4897290, at
*5 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2014); Steinberg v. CVS Caremark Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2d 331, 
336–37 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
142. Steinberg, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 339. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 337; Baser, 2014 WL 4897290, at *5. 
145. Ayday et al., supra note 106, at 5. 
146.  Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110­
233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.); 
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information to determine coverage, eligibility, or premiums; (2) request or 
require genetic testing or genetic information for underwriting decisions; 
and (3) obtain genetic information for underwriting purposes.147  Employers
with more than fifteen employees cannot “fail or refuse to hire . . .
discharge . . . or, otherwise to discriminate against any employee with respect 
to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” 
because of an employee’s genetic information.148 
In many of the actions brought under violation of GINA, the definition 
of “genetic information” was contested.149  Although numerous employment
lawsuits have used violation of GINA as a basis of a claim, many courts 
have concluded that plaintiffs failed to show a valid claim under GINA.150 
For example, in Dumas v. Hurley Medical Center, the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that the plaintiff did not 
provide sufficient basis for a claim under GINA because the allegation for 
termination was based on the plaintiff’s disclosure to the employer that
she suffered physical and mental disabilities.151  The court stated that the
complaint did not allege any use or misuse of genetic information.152 
GINA also extends coverage to genetic information of family members 
in addition to genetic information of individuals.153  In particular, the
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 67; Louise 
Slaughter, Essay, Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 
42 (2013).
147.  29 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012). 
148.  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff (2012). 
149. See, e.g., Conner-Goodgame v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 2:12-cv-03426-
IPJ, 2013 WL 5428448, at *10–11 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 26, 2013); Bell v. PSS World Med., 
Inc., No. 3:12-cv-381-J-99MMH-JRK, 2012 WL 6761660, at *2–3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 
2012); Graves v. Brookfield Suites Hotel & Convention Ctr., No. 11-CV-01060, 2012 WL
3941774, at *1 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 10, 2012); Leone v. N. Jersey Orthopaedic Specialists, 
P.A., No. 11-3957 (ES), 2012 WL 1535198, at*5 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2012); Culbreth v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. RWT 10cv3321, 2012 WL 959385, at *3–4 (D. Md. 
Mar. 19, 2012); Dumas v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 837 F. Supp. 2d 655, 666 (E.D. Mich. 2011). 
GINA defines “genetic information” as “individual’s genetic tests . . . the genetic tests of 
family members . . . the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such 
individual.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4).  GINA also includes genetic information from participation 
in genetic research. Id.
 150. See, e.g., Dumas, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 666.  Other courts have decided in a similar
manner, dismissing claims under GINA because the complaints did not state any basis for
discrimination based on genetic information. See, e.g., Conner-Goodgame, 2013 WL 
5428448 at *11; Williams v. Wells, No. 4:12-cv-02434-RBH, 2013 WL 4042037, at *1– 
2, *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2013); Bell, 2012 WL 6761660 at *3–4; Graves, 2012 WL 3941774
at *1; Leone, 2012 WL 1535198 at *6; Culbreth, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37335 at *4. 
151. Dumas, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 659, 666–67. 
152. Id. at 666. 
153. GINA defines family member as “a dependent . . . and [] any other individual 
who is a first-degree, second-degree, third-degree, or fourth-degree relative of such 
individual or of an individual described [as a dependent].” Genetic Information
776
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manifestation of a disease or disorder by a family member is considered 
genetic information under GINA.154  In Bronsdon v. City of Naples, the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida explained, “plaintiff 
alleges that defendant’s decision to deny benefits was based on his 
family’s medical history . . . discrimination based on family medical
history is prohibited under GINA, even if the individual has a manifested
condition.”155 However, family medical history is only critical as genetic
information if it is relevant in determining the individual’s risk for a 
genetic disease.156  In Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, the U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Virginia concluded that the plaintiff’s wife’s
diagnosis of multiple sclerosis did not provide sufficient basis for a claim 
under violation of GINA.157  The court stated that the plaintiff’s wife’s
diagnosis was not genetic information because his wife’s diagnosis is not
relevant to determine his genetic risks.158  In Lee v. City of Moraine Fire
Department, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
considered “information about whether an employee’s ‘primary relative’ 
has a history of prostate cancer” to be genetic information under GINA.159 
Although GINA provides protection against discrimination based on 
genetic information, it does not cover all instances of discrimination.160 
For example, it does not cover discrimination in disability insurance, life 
insurance, or long-term care.161  For public genomic information, GINA
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 122 Stat. 885 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(3) (2012)). 
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4).  Such information would include family disease history.
Id.
155. Bronsdon v. City of Naples, No. 2:13-cv-778-FtM-29CM, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 70502, at *8 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2014). 
156. Maxwell v. Verde Valley Ambulance Co., No. CV-13-08044-PCT-BSB, 2014 
WL 4470512, at *16–17 (D. Ariz. Sept. 11, 2014) (citing Poore v. Peterbilt of Bristol, 
L.L.C., 852 F. Supp. 2d 727 (W.D. Va. 2012)). 
157. Poore, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 731. 
158. Id. at 730–31.  “[S]uch information is taken into account only with respect to 
the individual in which such disease or disorder occurs and not as genetic information with 
respect to any other individual.” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-28, pt. 1, at 36 (2007)). 
159.  Lee v. City of Moraine Fire Dep’t, No. 3:13cv00222, 2014 WL 1775621, at *5 
(S.D. Ohio May 2, 2014). 
160. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
67. 
161. Brianna E. Kostecka, GINA Will Protect You, Just Not From Death: The 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act and Its Failure To Include Life Insurance 
within Its Protections, 34 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 93, 95 (2009); Angela L. Morrison, A 
Research Revolution: Genetic Testing Consumers Become Research (and Privacy) Guinea 
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C. The Common Rule: Regulation of Consent for Human Subjects 
In addition to anti-discrimination and privacy laws, another aspect of 
regulation regarding public genomics concerns the rules for human subject
research and consent.163  The Common Rule,164 a federal regulation
governing federally funded human subject research in the United States, 
requires an independent institutional review board (IRB) to review and 
approve procedures and informed consent for human subject research.165 
Informed consent includes describing the procedure, explaining the 
procedure’s risks and benefits, and providing the participants information
such as the right to withdraw from the study and the degree of confidentiality
in the research record. 166  However, previously available genomic data
Pigs, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 573, 583–84 (2011); Kimberly Shoenbill et al., 
Genetic Data and Electronic Health Records: A Discussion of Ethical, Logistical and 
Technological Considerations, 21 J.AM.MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 171, 174 (2014); Slaughter,
supra note 146, at 54.  In the hypothetical from the Introduction of this Comment, Krypton
was denied disability insurance based on his genetic information, and therefore may not
have a cause of action against the insurance company under GINA.  See supra Part I. 
162. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
66–67. 
163. Id. at 63–64. 
164. The “Common Rule” was published in 1991 and codified by fifteen Federal 
departments and agencies as separate regulations. Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects (‘Common Rule’), U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.
hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule/ [http://perma.cc/3L5Z-TNU8] (last visited
July 27, 2015).  The Department of Health and Human Services codified its rule in
Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46. Id.; Stanley G. Korenman, Common Rule, 
TEACHING RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT RES. HUMANS (RCRH), http://ori.hhs.gov/education/
products/ucla/chapter2/page04b.htm [http://perma.cc/3ZF3-LT9U] (last visited July 27, 
2015).
165. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2014).  At least five professionals
of various backgrounds, including at least one scientist and at least one non-scientist, are 
required for the institutional review board (IRB).  Id. § 46.107.  The IRB must also include 
at least one member who is not affiliated with the institution and not an immediate family
member of someone affiliated with the institution that is reviewed.  Id.  For IRB approval, 
the Common Rule sets forth criteria including: 1) minimizing risks to subjects; 2) evaluation 
of risk to subject compared to anticipated benefits; 3) equitable selection of subjects; 4)
obtaining informed consent for subjects; 5) documented informed consent; 6) provisions 
to ensure subject safety; and 7) provisions to protect privacy of subjects and confidentiality
of data. Id. § 46.111. 
166. Id. § 46.116.  One court has tested the reach of the Common Rule in the context 
of ownership of biological samples used in human subject research.  Washington Univ. v.
Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 990–91 (E.D. Mo. 2006).  In Washington Univ. v. Catalona, 
the university filed a declaratory judgment action against the doctor who directed the 
research and the research participant who provided the sample to establish ownership of 
778
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free of identifying information can be used for additional research purposes 
without further IRB review or additional consent.167 
This highlights some limitations of the Common Rule for public genomics 
projects. For example, in some public genomics projects, prior consent 
likely did not state the newly discovered risk of re-identification.168 
Furthermore, genomic information itself inherently contains re-identifiable 
data, and the lack of consent requirement for de-identified information may
pose additional risks.169  The de-identification requirements of the Common
Rule are even lower than under HIPAA.170  In addition, the Common Rule
only applies to federally funded research, so many public genomics or
open-source genomics projects are not covered.171 
To address some of the issues regarding data re-identification and 
consent, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) published
an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning whether certain
types of genomic data should be considered identifiable.172  For example, 
DHHS recognizes the risks of re-identification, and proposes to make the 
the sample.  Id. at 987.  The District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri decided that 
the university obtained proper consent under the Common Rule and retains ownership of 
the biological materials. Id. at 991, 1002. 
167. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(4) (exempting “[r]esearch involving the collection or 
study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or diagnostic 
specimens, if these sources are publicly available or if the information is recorded by the
investigator in such a manner that subjects cannot be identified, directly or through
identifiers linked to the subjects”); PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL 
ISSUES, supra note 1, at 63–64; OHRP Guidance on Research Involving Coded Private 
Information or Biological Specimens, OFF. FOR HUM. RES. PROTECTIONS, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy/cdebiol.html 
[http://perma.cc/SM6L-2VLZ] [hereinafter OHRP Guidance].
168. Conley, supra note 15, at 329; Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408. 
169. Rothstein, supra note 87, at 6.
 170. See OHRP Guidance, supra note 167. For example, under the Common Rule
guidelines, information is considered “[not] . . . individually identifiable when they cannot 
be linked to specific individuals by the investigator(s) either directly or through coding 
system.”  Id.  The Common Rule considers any coded information, where individual identity is
converted into a code, or a number, de-identified.  Id.; Rothstein, supra note 87, at 5. 
171. COMM. ON HEALTH RESEARCH AND THE PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFO.: THE HIPAA
PRIVACY RULE, INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE:
ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH 126 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. 
eds., 2009).
172. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research 
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg.
44,512, 44,524 (proposed July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50, 56 and 45
C.F.R. pt. 46, 160, 164). 
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Common Rule de-identification standard at least equal to the HIPAA 
standard, if not stricter.173  Several different interest groups have presented 
opposing views dealing with whether genomic data contains information
that is inherently identifiable, but DHHS has not released new guidelines.174 
D. State Laws Regarding Genetic Information 
Many states have additional anti-discrimination or privacy laws that 
offer varying scope protection.175  Some of the state laws were enacted 
before GINA, and some serve to fill the gaps in protection under GINA.176 
GINA provides minimum protection as a federal law, but allows states to
provide additional safeguards.177 
Nineteen states have additional protection from discrimination beyond 
protection in employment and health insurance provided by GINA, such 
173. 	Id. at 44,524–25. 
[R]apidly evolving advances in technology coupled with the increasing volume 
of data readily available may soon allow identification of an individual from
data that is currently considered deidentified . . . . We are considering adopting 
the HIPAA standards for purposes of the Common Rule regarding what 
constitutes individually identifiable information . . . . [I]t might be advisable to 
evaluate the set of identifiers that must be removed for a data set to be considered
“de-identified” under both human subjects regulations and the HIPAA Privacy
Rule . . . [W]e are considering categorizing all research involving the primary
collection of biospecimens as well as storage and secondary analysis of existing
biospecimens as research involving identifiable information . . . . 
Id.
 174. See, e.g., American Anthropological Association, Comment Letter on Proposed 
Rule on Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/upload/Human-Subjects-Research.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2A63-QKAG]; Biotechnology Industry Organization, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule on Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research
Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators (Oct. 26, 2011), 
https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/BIO%20Common%20Rule%20ANPRM%20com
ments%20FINAL-10%2026%202011_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GBJ-42QB]; Consortium 
of Independent Review Boards, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Human Subjects 
Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, 
Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.consortiumofirb.org/
Comments_on_ANPRM_October_2011.pdf [http://perma.cc/CH7D-4PKN]; World Privacy
Forum, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Human Subjects Research Protections: 
Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity
for Investigators (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/10/WPF_CommonRule_Oct182011fs.pdf [http://perma.cc/NAR5-Z4BM]; see also
Williams & Wolf, supra note 107, at 446. 
175. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
67. 
176. Id.; Kostecka, supra note 161, at 101. 
177. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
67. 
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as in life insurance, long-term care, or disability insurance.178  For example, 
the California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act extends anti-
discrimination protection for emergency medical services, housing, receipt 
of services, qualifications for licensing, and participation in any state-
funded programs, providing one of the widest range of protection beyond 
federal GINA.179 
178. The nineteen states with their respective genetic information protection statues 
are: Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448, 41-1463 (2011 & Supp. 2014); California:
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51(b) (West Supp. 2015); CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12926(i)(2) (West Supp.
2015); CAL. INS. CODE 10149.1 (West 2013); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3­
1104.7(1) (2014); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-8301–8304 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 41-1313 (West 2010); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-2259, 44-1009(a)(9) (2000
& Supp. 2014); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.12-085(2)–(3) (West 2012); Maine: 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2159-C (2015); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 19302 
(2013); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 18-120, 27-909 (LexisNexis 2011); MD. CODE
ANN., STATE GOV’T. § 20-606 (LexisNexis 2014); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 151B, § 4 (West Supp. 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, §§ 108H, 108I, 120E 
(West 2011); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. §§ 72A.139, 181.974, 375.1306 (2014); Missouri:
MO. REV. STAT. § 375.1303 (West 2013); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141­
H:1 to H:4 (2014); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17B:26-3.2, 17B:30-12 (West 2014); 
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-1 to -7 (West 2014); New York: N.Y. EXEC. LAW. 
§ 296 (McKinney 2014); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l (McKinney 2014); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 2615 (McKinney 2014); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 192.531, 659A.303 (2013); Texas: 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 546.001–.051 (West 2014); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.401– 
.402 (West 2014); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 §§ 9331–34 (2014); Wisconsin: WIS.
STAT. §§ 111.32–.335, 631.89 (2014). See Anya E.R. Prince, Comprehensive Protection 
of Genetic Information: Once Size Privacy or Property Models May Not Fit All, 79
BROOKLYN L. REV. 175, 183–85 (2013).  If Krypton were a resident of one of the states
that provide protection for disability insurance, such as Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Vermont or Wisconsin, he may have a valid state 
claim against the disability insurance company who discriminated against him in his 
disability insurance application.  See supra Part I. 
179. 2011 Cal Legis. Serv. 2888 (West).  California Genetic Information Nondiscrimination 
Act was proposed as S.B. 559 by Alex Padilla in the 2011-2012 Regular Session and was 
codified as amended at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 23438; CAL. CIV. CODE § 51; CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 32228; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 354.5; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 11135, 12920,
12921, 12926, 12926.1, 12930, 12931, 12935, 12940, 12944, 12955, 12955.8, 12956.1,
12956.2, 12993; CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.8; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17269, 24343.2;
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 4900.  Id. See also Jennifer K. Wagner, A New Law To Raise
GINA’s Floor in California, GENOMICS L. REP. (Dec. 7, 2011), http://www.genomics 
lawreport.com/index.php/2011/12/07/a-new-law-to-raise-ginas-floor-in-california/ [http://
perma.cc/6BVQ-5MG6].  California’s protection is one of the first strong and comprehensive
protections against discrimination. Prince, supra note 178, at 211. 
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States typically focus on either a property regime or a privacy regime
in the establishment of genetic information protection legislation.180  States 
that have a property regime for protection focus on the genetic material 
itself, such as property interest of the DNA sample, and cover limited 
genetic information.181  Under the property regime, the statutes provide
the genetic information providers, such as participants of a genomics study, 
property rights to their genetic information.182  For example, Alaska Statutes
section 18.13.010(a)(2), with the broadest protection, provides that the 
DNA samples and the results of a DNA analysis are exclusive property of 
the person providing the samples.183  The Alaska statute provides a private
right of action against those who surreptitiously collect a DNA sample or 
those who disclose DNA testing results.184  These laws tend to focus on 
the consent requirements for gathering DNA samples, and to a limited 
extent, genetic information.185 
Other states have constitutional provisions regarding privacy or separate 
privacy protection laws.186  Ten states have constitutional provisions that
180. The five states that create a property regime in protecting genetic information
with their respective genetic information protection statues are: Alaska: ALASKA STAT. §
18.13 (2014); Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(1) (2014); Florida: FLA. STAT.
§§ 760.40(2)(a), 627.6561 ( 2014); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2014); Louisiana: 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023(E) (2014). See Prince, supra note 178, at 183–185. 
181. Prince, supra note 178, at 195. 
182. Jana M. Belflower, Note, Keeping Pace With Progress: A Proposal for Florida’s
Genetic Testing Statute, 42 STETSON L. REV. 249, 264–65 (2012). 
183. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2014).  The Colorado, Georgia, and Louisiana
statutes are limited to insurance contexts. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.6 (2014); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2013); LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (2014).  The Florida statute is not 
limited to insurance contexts, and it only applies to genetic analysis results and not the
physical sample itself.  FLA. STAT. § 760.40 (2014); Belflower, supra note 182, at 265 
n.104. The District Court of Appeal of Florida has tested the consent requirement for 
genetic analysis of the Florida statute in Doe v. Suntrust Bank, 34 So. 3d 133 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2010) where the plaintiff, the decedent’s trust, sued the known children of the 
decedent to submit to DNA testing in order to determine whether the alleged children were 
related to the known children. Suntrust Bank, 32 So. 3d at 135–36.  The court quashed the
trial court order to produce DNA analysis samples, stating that the purpose of the statute 
is to protect individuals from unconsented DNA analysis, and that the plaintiff did not 
provide sufficient “good cause” for the request. Id. at 138–41 (stating that the section 
760.40 of the Florida Statutes “criminalizes performing DNA analysis or disclosing the 
results without obtaining the informed consent of the person tested.”). 
184. ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.020 (2014) (“A person may bring a civil action against 
a person who collects a DNA sample from the person, performs a DNA analysis on a 
sample, retains a DNA sample or the results of a DNA analysis, or discloses the results of 
a DNA analysis in violation of this chapter.”). 
185. Prince, supra note 178, at 195–96. 
186. See Prince, supra note 178, at 184; Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, 
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relate to the right of privacy.187  In addition to provisions that mirror the
Fourth Amendment protections regarding search and seizure, the state 
privacy provisions also have specific references to privacy, and provide 
an expanded privacy protection.188  In Hawaii, the state supreme court 
evaluated the state’s constitutional right of privacy in the medical
information context.189  In  Cohan v. Ayabe, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
granted a mandamus relief to prevent the release of confidential health
information outside of the specific litigation, reasoning that although the
187. The ten states with their respective state constitution provisions regarding
privacy protection are: Alaska: ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to 
privacy is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); Arizona: ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 (“No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law.”); California: CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“[A]mong [the inalienable rights of people] are 
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting 
property; and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness.”); Florida: FLA. CONST. art. I, § 
23  (“Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental 
intrusion into the person’s private life except as otherwise provided herein.”); Florida: 
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the 
unreasonable interception of private communications by any means, shall not be
violated.”); Hawaii: HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The right of the people to privacy is 
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”);
Hawaii: HAW. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures and invasions of privacy
shall not be violated[.]”); Illinois: ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“The people shall have the right
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable 
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping
devices or other means.”); Louisiana: LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person shall be secure 
in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.”); Montana: MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The 
right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.”); South Carolina: S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of 
privacy shall not be violated . . . .”); Washington: WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person
shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”).
See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, supra note 186.  In addition, Missouri
voters approved a state constitutional amendment that provides protection for unreasonable 
search and seizure of electronic data, making the law the first of its kind in the nation.
Jason C. Gavejian, Missouri Constitutional Amendment Protects Electronic Privacy, 
WORKPLACE PRIVACY, DATA MGMT. & SECURITY REP. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www. 
workplaceprivacyreport.com/2014/08/articles/workplace-investigations/missouri­
constitutional-amendment-protects-electronic-privacy/ [http://perma.cc/NJ3K-FAVB].
188. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, supra note 186. 
189. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; Cohan v. Ayabe, 322 P.3d 948, 965 (Haw. 2014). 
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information was de-identified, there was a risk of re-identification that 
would amount to an invasion of privacy under Article I, Section 6 of 
Hawaii’s constitution.190 In other cases, state constitutional privacy 
provisions were tested in the context of criminal law DNA data banks or
court-ordered paternity testing.191  However, courts have not evaluated 
privacy protections provided by the state constitution in the context of re-
identification of public genomic information.192 
State legislation focusing on privacy rights of genetic information vary 
widely in the scope of coverage.193  Ten states have general privacy 
protection laws regarding an individual’s right to privacy in genetic 
190. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 6; Cohan, 322 P.3d at 965 (citing Nw. Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 933 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
191. See, e.g., Nason v. State, 102 P.3d 962 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (upholding the 
constitutionality of sections 44.41.035(b) and 11.56.760(a) of the Alaska DNA collection 
statutes); People v. Buza, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Ct. App. 2014) (striking down the 
Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998, section 295 of the California
Penal Code, as being invalid under article I, section 13 and 1 of the California Constitution
because it intrudes the arrestee’s privacy), cert. granted, 342 P.3d 415 (Cal. 2015) (mem.);
Cnty. of San Diego v. Mason, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 135 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the trial 
court’s order for DNA paternity testing did not violate privacy provided under article 1, 
section 1 of the California Constitution). 
192. LexisAdvance searches performed on January 18, 2015, with the following 
search terms resulted in no cases: genom! and (privacy and constitution!) and (re-identif!
or reidentif!); genom! and (privacy and constitution!) and (de-identif! or deidentif!); 
(genom! and privacy) and (re-identif! or reidentif!); (genom! and privacy) and (de-identif! 
or deidentif!).  The search term “(constitution! and privacy) and (genom! or genet!) and
(re-identif! or reidentif!)” resulted in three cases, but none were relevant to publicly
available genetic information.  Higgins v. Tex. Dep’t of Health Servs., 801 F. Supp. 2d
541 (W.D. Tex. 2011); People v. Boyer, 133 P.3d 581 (Cal. 2006); Meyers v. Zoning Bd. 
of Appeals, No. CV 950535547, 1997 WL 325816 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 3, 1997). In
Higgins v. Texas Department of Health Services, a class of parents whose infant children’s 
blood samples were taken for screening under section 33.011 of the Annotated Texas
Health and Safety Code sued the Texas Department and Health Services, stating concerns 
of re-distribution and re-identification as one of the reasons. Higgins, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 
544–47. The Federal District Court for the Western District of Texas held that the 
plaintiffs only had a speculative injury and were unable to substantiate their concerns about 
re-distribution or re-identification; therefore, they lacked standing. Id. at 553. Most
litigation regarding genetic data involve challenges to forensic DNA databases under state 
privacy provisions or the Fourth Amendment of the constitution. See, e.g., cases cited 
supra note 191; U.S. v. Pool, 621 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2010) (determining that the 
government’s interest in identification using DNA data outweighed defendant’s privacy
interests), vacated, 659 F.3d 761 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc); Banks v. U.S., 490 F.3d 1178 
(10th Cir. 2007) (deciding that enforcement DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000 did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 
813 (9th Cir. 2004) (deciding that DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, which 
requires certain convicted individuals to provide biological samples for DNA analysis, did 
not violate defendant’s Forth Amendment rights). 
193. See Prince, supra note 178, at 198. 
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information.194 These laws establish rules on collection, access, retention 
and disclosure of genetic information, and generally require informed
consent to collect, access, retain, or disclose the genetic information.195 
For example, New Jersey’s Genetic Privacy Act forbids collecting, retaining,
or disclosing genetic information without authorization from the
individual providing the genetic information.196  Delaware requires physical
genetic samples to be destroyed promptly after obtaining genetic
information unless necessary for criminal investigation, authorized by
court order, authorized by the individual, or necessary for anonymous 
research purposes where the identity of the subject is not released.197  New 
York’s statute considers the privacy risks to the relatives in addition to the 
risks posed to the individuals themselves.198  Some states that provide
privacy or property-based protection of genetic information include 
194. The ten states with their respective state constitution provisions regarding
privacy protection are: Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16 § 1202(a) (2012) (establishing a 
privacy interest); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.18 § 2317 (2012) (regulating insurance); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 19 § 711 (2012) (regulating employment); Illinois: 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/1– 
/35 (2013); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 729.6 (West 2010); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. §
13.386(3)(4)(ii) (2010) (establishing a privacy interest); MINN. STAT. § 72A.139 (2010)
(regulating health and life insurance); MINN. STAT. § 181.974 (2010) (regulating 
employment); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 141-H:1–:4 (LexisNexis 2009);
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-43 to -48 (West 2010) (establishing a privacy
interest); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:26-3.2 (West 2010) (regulating genetic information in
health insurance); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West 2010) (regulating life and disability
insurance); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-21-1 to -7 (2005); New York: N.Y. EXEC.
LAW. § 296 (McKinney 2014) (regulating employment); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-l
(McKinney 2014) (establishing a privacy right); N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615 (McKinney 2014)
(regulating health, life, long-term care, and disability insurances); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT.
§ 192.531 (2012) (establishing a privacy right); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.303 (2012)
(regulating employment); OR. REV. STAT. § 746.135 (2012); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 34-14-22 (2003) (establishing a privacy right); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-1-25
(2003) (regulating health insurance); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 60-2-20 (2003) (regulating
employment).  See also Prince, supra note 178, at 198. 
195. See Prince, supra note 178, at 198.  Interestingly, the Minnesota statute provides
that written consent for dissemination is only valid for one year at most.  MINN. STAT. §
13.386(3)(4)(ii) (West 2010). 
196. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-45 (West 2010). 
197. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. § 1203(b) (2012). 
198. N.Y. INS. LAW § 2615 (McKinney 2014) (“No person who lawfully possesses 
information derived from a genetic test who may be genetically related to the tested
individual; nor shall any inferences be drawn, used, or communicated regarding the 
possible genetic status of the non-consenting individual.”). 
785















   
  
  
   
   
    
 
 





    
  
   
  
 
   
 
 
penalties, such as fines or imprisonment, for violations of the statute.199 
Unfortunately, these states statutes generally provide exceptions for 
anonymized genetic research, and therefore would not apply to de­
identified public genomic data.200 
E. National Institutes of Health Genomic Data Sharing Policy
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) recently issued the NIH Genomic 
Data Sharing Policy, which applies to larger NIH-funded genomic studies 
with 100 or more subjects.201  The new policy states that genomic data
must be de-identified by the removal of the eighteen HIPAA identifiers.202 
Researchers may release the data through either unrestricted access or 
controlled access methods.203  The risk of re-identification must be
explicitly conveyed to the subjects, particularly for open access data
repositories.204 
The NIH policy also sets forth data release policies and the responsibilities 
of the users accessing the publicly available genomic data.205  Users 
seeking access to the controlled data must submit a request, and upon 
199. See  ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.020 (2014) (“In addition to the actual damages 
suffered by the person, a person violating this chapter shall be liable to the person for 
damages in the amount of $5,000 or, if the violation resulted in profit or monetary gain to
the violator, $100,000.”); CAL. INS. CODE §10149.1 (West 2013) (“Any person who 
negligently discloses results of a test for a genetic characteristic . . . shall be assessed a 
civil penalty in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) plus court 
costs[.]”); DEL. CODE ANN. 16 § 1208 (2014) (“Any person who willfully obtains or
discloses genetic information in violation of this subchapter shall be punished by a fine
not less than $5,000 nor more than $50,000.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 374.049 (2013) (“An
order to impose a civil penalty or forfeiture . . . One thousand dollars per each level two 
violation, up to an aggregate civil penalty or forfeiture of fifty thousand dollars per annum 
for multiple violations”); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.541 (2013) (setting forth different levels 
of fine if greater than actual damages, depending on the intent of the violator); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18 § 9335 (2014) (“Any person who intentionally violates section 9333 or
subsection 9334(a) of this chapter shall be imprisoned not more than one year or fined not 
more than $10,000.00, or both.”). 
200. See Prince, supra note 178, at 206–07. 
201. Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345, 51,345 (Aug. 
28, 2014); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION TO THE
NIH GENOMIC DATA SHARING POLICY (2014), http://gds.nih.gov/pdf/supplemental_ 
info_GDS_Policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/S88K-4PVN]. 
202. Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,345. See supra
note 129 for a list of HIPAA identifiers. 
203. Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,351.  For a more 
detailed discussion on access control, see infra Part V.C.1. 
204.  Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,348. 
205. Id. at 51,352. See also Genomic Data User Code of Conduct, NAT’L INSTS. OF
HEALTH (Apr. 2, 2010), http://gds.nih.gov/pdf/Genomic_Data_User_Code_of_Conduct.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YP63-K3W4] (establishing a code for researchers using dbGaP). 
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grant, they can only use the data for approved research.206  Approved users 
cannot attempt re-identification or provide the data to unauthorized users.207 
Overall, this policy acknowledges the risk of re-identification and emphasizes 
the requirement of informed consent that includes disclosure of access 
levels and risks to the subjects.208 
F. International Guidelines 
Many of the public genomics projects are international, so current 
legislation in the United States does not apply to all data from public
genomics projects.209  Some countries or jurisdictions have general privacy
laws which encompass genetic information.210  For example, the European
Union’s Data Protection Directive offers privacy protection for sensitive 
data regulated by data commissions, such as health-related data.211  The
directive covers any type of “personal data” that can be “directly or 
206. Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,352.  See also 
Paltoo et al., supra note 25, at 935–36 (describing the access process for dbGaP).  Access 
requests are reviewed by NIH Data Access Committees “composed of senior Federal 
employees with appropriate scientific, bioethics, and human subjects’ research expertise.” 
NIH Data Access Committees and Chairs, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://gds.nih. 
gov/04po2_1DAC.html [http://perma.cc/A42X-R6SF] (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).  The 
policy additionally recommends that investigators obtain a Certificate of Confidentiality
as a safeguard to prevent forced disclosure of the accessed genomic information.  Final 
NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,351–52 (Aug. 28, 2014).  Certificates
of Confidentiality are issued by NIH to protect identifiable research information, including 
genomic and clinical data, from forced disclosure in court or other proceedings.
Certificates of Confidentiality (CoC) Kiosk, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/
grants/policy/coc/index.htm [http://perma.cc/ZSL8-ZMLY] (last updated July 24, 2015). 
For a discussion of the limits of the Certificate of Confidentiality, see Brown & Lowenberg, 
supra note 29, at 93–97. 
207.  Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. at 51,352. 
208. See id. at 51,348, 51,351. 
209. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 12. 
210. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
65. For example, the European Union has a Directive that provides strict overarching 
privacy protection.  Council Directive 95/46, art. 1–2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC). 
211. Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 38 (EC).  The European Union
has strict privacy protection laws, and personal data can only be obtained “under strict
conditions, for a legitimate purpose.”  Protection of Personal Data, EUR. COMMISSION, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/ [http://perma.cc/6CUS-45GU] (last updated
Aug. 27, 2015).  “Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”  Council Directive 
95/46, art. 8(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 40 (EC) (emphasis added). 
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indirectly” linked to a person, by any administrator, including public and 
private institutions.212  However, the directive excludes public data, and is
criticized as overreaching because all data that is potentially re-identifiable, 
regardless of the presence of other protective measures, can be regulated
under this directive.213  Other countries specifically have laws regulating 
genetic information and research, including consent, and anonymization.214 
General international guidelines and principles, including the Nuremberg
Code for human subject consent,215 the United Nations International
Declaration on Human Genetic Data and Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights216 serve as general principles in the
research community.  Additionally, the international research community
is working to achieve self-governing guidelines for genomic data sharing 
and data security.217  Although these are not legally binding regulations, 
the scientific research and medical communities are actively discussing
 212. Ohm, supra note 9, at 1738. 
213. Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(2)(e), 8(3), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 38 (EC).  The 
Directive excludes data processing that is
manifestly made public by the data subject or is necessary for the establishment,
exercise or defence of legal claims . . . required for the purposes of preventive 
medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the management 
of health-care services, and where those data are processed by a health
professional . . . . 
Id.; Ohm, supra note 9, at 1738, 1741. 
214. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
65. For example, Chile has a law that regulates genetic research and prohibits discrimination 
on basis of genetic heritage.  The law additionally sets forth the confidentiality of genetic 
information and anonymization of genetic data.  Law No. 20120, Septiembre 22, 2006, 
DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile). Estonia, France, Spain, Germany and Israel also have 
similar laws.  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1,
at 65, 133, n.120. 
215. 2 U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181–82 
(1949), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-II.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/S7XD-UZ4K].
216. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization Res. 2003/22, International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data, (Oct. 16, 2003), http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/ 
0013/001331/133171e.pdf#page=45 [http://perma.cc/F7C4-K68P]; Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization Res. 1997/16, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome
and Human Rights (Nov. 11, 1997), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13177 
&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [http://perma.cc/53WB-D9JP]. 
217. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 1, 6; GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR GENOMICS 
& HEALTH, Security Infrastructure: Standards and Implementation Practices for
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and collaborating to build self-governing guidelines for genomic data to
minimize potential privacy breach.218 
V. MULTIMERIC SOLUTION TO APPROACH PRIVACY ISSUES
To address the emerging privacy issues from re-identification of publicly 
available genomic data, a multi-pronged solution must be implemented
due to the complexity of privacy issues and the numerous stakeholders
involved.219  The solution to prevent re-identification and minimize the
risks to family and relatives should focus on strengthening protection by 
banning malicious re-identification and providing broader anti-discrimination 
protection. The issue of consent should be addressed by updates to the
Common Rule and through participant education.  Although legislation 
alone cannot solve the multitude of potential issues,220 it will provide a
solid foundation to prevent privacy breaches for participants who have 
risked their privacy for the benefit of scientific progress.  Complementary
self-governance approaches by the research community, such as access 
control and data standardization, are required to address some of the 
difficulties in providing a basic level of protection globally.221
 218. See Altman, supra note 76, at 1033; P3G Consortium et al., supra note 25, at 
1–4; GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR GENOMICS & HEALTH, http://genomicsandhealth.org/ [http:// 
perma.cc/KZ2R-S2H8] (last visited July 25, 2015). 
219. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 6–12 (listing potential stakeholders, 
including research participants, researchers, data custodians, clinicians, the public, regulatory
agency, organizer of public consortia, organizers of crowd-sourcing projects, and private 
direct-to-consumer providers.)
220. See, PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 
1, at 4–11.  In particular, legislation sometimes lags behind the technological developments. 
See, e.g., John Burn-Murdoch, Data Protection Law Is in Danger of Lagging Behind 
Technological Change, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2013, 7:25 AM), http://www.theguardian. 
com/news/datablog/2013/apr/12/data-protection-law-lagging-behind-technology [http:// 
perma.cc/68QC-2XWB]; State of Federal Privacy and Data Security Law: Lagging
Behind the Times?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Oversight of Gov’t Mgmt., the Fed. 
Workforce, and D.C. of the S. Comm. On Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 112th 
Cong. 19–21 (2012) (statement of Peter Swire, C. William O’Neill Professor of Law, Ohio 
State Univ.), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76066/pdf/CHRG-112shrg
76066.pdf [http://perma.cc/5W4Q-UVQC].
221. See, e.g., RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 9–10. 
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A. Addressing Re-identification and Effects on Relatives 
1. Ban on Malicious Re-identification 
Some privacy experts have proposed a proactive ban on re-identification 
which would establish various penalties for re-identification except in 
cases of approved re-identification research.222  For example, privacy policy 
consultant Robert Gellman proposed a legislation that “establishes standards 
for behavior and proposes civil and criminal penalties for violations.”223 
In this proposal, “data recipients would also be required to maintain technical, 
administrative, and other safeguards against re-identification.”224  Gellman 
proposes a “legislative-based contractual solution” where the data discloser 
and the data recipient voluntarily enter into a contract that defines the
responsibilities of each party, and offers remedies if one of the parties 
injures the data subject.225  In exchange for the responsibilities, the data
recipients “would benefit [from] being able to offer potential disclosers 
more assurance that a data transfer will not create liabilities.”226 Regardless
of whether criminal punishment is appropriate, imposing penalties would 
help deter malicious adversaries from re-identification efforts.227 
In addition, the ban should clearly provide the participants a cause of 
action and a remedy if the participant suffers a consequence of malicious 
re-identification,228 such as in Krypton’s denial of insurance in the hypothetical.
As current medical privacy protection under HIPAA does not provide a 
222. Barth-Jones, supra note 80, at 14; Robert Gellman, Deidentification Dilemma: 
A Legislative and Contractual Proposal, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
33 (2010); Ohm, supra note 9, at 1758, n.120. 
223. Gellman, supra note 222, at 48, 59 (proposing a civil penalty for persons who 
fail to report a breach of data, and a fine or imprisonment for those who willfully re-
identifies or sells re-identified information). 
224. Id. at 49. 
225. A data discloser would be someone who initially has the data, such as those 
running the public genomics projects. Id. at 48.  A data recipient would be someone who
is looking to have access to the data, such as a scientist seeking to obtain the existing data 
for future analysis. Id.  A data subject would be someone whose information is contained 
in the data, such as participants of public genomics projects. Id. at 35. 
226. Id. at 49. 
227. Id. at 53. Penalties can include civil fines similar to those set forth in state 
statutes for genetic privacy violations.  Id. 
228. See id. at 53. Generally, HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action for
cases of privacy violation.  Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 570 (5th Cir. 2006); Steinberg
v. CVS Caremark Corp., 899 F. Supp. 2d 331, 337 (E.D. Pa. 2012); Carol Gerner & Fred 
Smith, HIPAA Does Not Provide Right of Action in Privacy Violation Cases, HEALTHCARE
L. NEWSL. (Apr. 2007), http://www.sedgwicklaw.com/Publications/detail.aspx?pub=4680
[http://perma.cc/5NMW-6PCE].  Plaintiffs often bring actions under violation of related
state laws. See, e.g., Steinberg, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 337–39; Acosta v. Byrum, 638 S.E.2d
246, 253 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
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cause of action for participants,229 a right of action should be provided for
privacy violations under HIPAA.230 
The re-identification ban should encompass public information, because 
re-identification concerns are most prominent for such information.231 
Public information does not require a security breach to obtain, but 
adversaries still can re-identify the information for privacy breach or
discrimination.232  This type of ban would be broader than Gellman’s
contractual approach between the data discloser and data recipient because
any member of the public can be a data recipient without a contract.233 
Privacy scholar Daniel Barth-Jones suggests “[p]rohibiting of the re-
identification, or attempted re-identification, of individuals and their 
relatives, family or household members . . . establish[ing] civil and criminal 
penalties for any unauthorized re-identification of de-identified data.”234 
To protect participants who provided their information to public genomics 
projects, the re-identification ban should also apply to information that is
already public. 
A re-identification ban may be difficult to enforce when the data is
already publicly available and because detecting acts of re-identification 
is difficult.235 However, stricter penalties and providing a right of action 
and clear remedies for citizens whose privacy was violated by re-
identification would bolster deterrence and help overcome the difficulties 
in enforcement.236  In addition, if clear access control and audit processes 
are implemented,237 re-identification efforts may be easier to detect and a
ban may be easier to enforce.238 
A restriction on re-identification, however, should not prohibit re-
identification research.239  Part of the solution requires an accurate risk
 229. See supra note 228. 
230. See, e.g., Ohm,  supra note 9, at 1758.
 231. See id. at 1717. 
232. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 1, at 14–16; Rothstein, supra note 87, at 8; Ohm, supra note 9, at 1717. 
233. See generally Gellman, supra note 222. 
234. Barth-Jones, supra note 80, at 14. 
235. Ohm, supra note 9, at 1758. 
236. Id.
 237. See supra Part V.C a for a more detailed discussion on access control. 
238. Ohm, supra note 9, at 1758. 
239. Salil Vadhan et al., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule on Human Subjects 
Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, 
Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators (Oct. 26, 2011), http://privacytools.seas.harvard. 
edu/files/privacytools/files/commonruleanprm.pdf [http://perma.cc/CQV5-2MZL]. 
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assessment of re-identification.240  Analogous to financial privacy or
social network data privacy, there are risks and benefits associated with
the use of the technology and making information public.241  The bulk of
the risk assessment comes from re-identification research, and therefore 
re-identification for research purposes should be an exception to the
ban.242  Risk assessment should also include determining actual realistic
probabilities that a non-expert can be successful in re-identification.243 
Updated risk assessments are also necessary as new technologies develop
and as more information, both genomic data and other personal information,
becomes public.244  Accurate risk assessment and risk management can 
reduce fears of privacy violations and help encourage participation in 
public genomics projects.245 
Therefore, the legislature should prioritize prohibiting malicious re-
identification as a solution to protect participant privacy, while allowing
data scientists to accurately determine additional re-identification risks.
The re-identification ban should also apply to public information, and 
should be complemented by other legislative approaches, such as broader 
anti-discrimination protection.
240. Jean E. McEwen et al., Evolving Approaches to the Ethical Management of 
Genomic Data, 29 TRENDS GENETICS 375, 378–79 (2013); C. Heeney et al., Assessing the 
Privacy Risks of Data Sharing in Genomics, 14 PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 17, 17 (2011),
http://www.karger.com/Article/Pdf/294150 [http://perma.cc/8HEB-JW2U].
241. Bruce R. Korf, Genomic Privacy in the Information Age, 59 CLINICAL 
CHEMISTRY 1148, 1149 (2013).  Despite the risks of identity thieves and publicized security
breaches, credit cards are still used and personal information is voluntarily published in
social networking websites and every day. Id.  Therefore, with accurate risk assessment
and protective measures, encouragement of participation in public genomics is possible. 
Id. In fact, it is still much easier and effective to hack into financial information rather
than health related or genomic information, so the incentives for health information 
hacking or re-identification may be smaller.  Ohm, supra note 9, at 1767. 
242. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 420.  Careful risk assessment based on 
risks and implications of actual cases of re-identification is necessary. Id.  Barth-Jones 
suggests a re-identification ban that allows “Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved 
reidentification research to be conducted, but would ban any re-identification attempts 
conducted without essential human subjects research protections.”  Barth-Jones, supra
note 80, at 14. 
243.  Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 420. 
244. See David W. Craig et al., Assessing and Managing Risk When Sharing
Aggregate Genetic Variant Data, 12 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 730, 730 (2011); Korf,
supra note 241, at 1149; Ohm, supra note 9, at 1705; J.M. Oliver et al., Balancing the 
Risks and Benefits of Genomic Data Sharing: Genome Research Participants’ Perspectives, 15
PUB. HEALTH GENOMICS 106 (2012). 
245. See Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 419–20. 
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2. Broader Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
GINA and some state laws provide protection against certain types of 
discrimination based on genetic data.246  However, the protection excludes
certain information, such as manifested symptoms.247  This protection is
also limited to employment and health insurance, and does not apply to 
other situations such as life insurance, disability and long-term care.248 
Although GINA provides a good minimum federal protection against
discrimination based on genetic information, it fails to cover other
potentially discriminatory situations, and the existence and scope of 
complementary state laws vary widely.249  GINA should expand to fill the
gaps for anti-discrimination, such as in cases of life insurance, disability
and long-term care.250  GINA should also specifically provide patients
with protection against discrimination using re-identified data.251 
3. Data Privacy Protection Legislation 
GINA does not address privacy issues, but the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
provides some measure of privacy protection for personally identifiable 
information.252 In addition to HIPAA, general privacy laws, such as those
provided by state constitutional privacy provisions or statutes, can also be 
a means to provide fundamental privacy protection.253  These laws may 
bolster the protection against re-identification threats,254 in addition to
 246. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
77–80. 
247. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic 
Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 455–56 (2010).  Under GINA,
a test that detects a condition that has manifested itself (a test to determine symptomatic 
persons) is not a “genetic test.”  Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1191b(d)(7)(B) (Supp. II 2009)). 
248.  Shoenbill et al., supra note 161, at 174; Slaughter, supra note 146, at 54. 
249. See supra Part IV., pts. 1–5. 
250. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 1, at 77; Morrison, supra note 161, at 584; Shoenbill et al., supra note 161, at 174. 
251. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 1, at 77–80; Morrison, supra note 161, at 597–98; Shoenbill et al., supra note 161, at 
177. 
252. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
66–67. 
253. See supra Part IV.D. 
254. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
4–10. 
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serving as a ban on malicious re-identification and a strong anti-discrimination 
measure.
There are two main limitations with HIPAA regarding public genomics.
First, although the HIPAA list of identifiers includes “biometric identifiers,”255 
HIPAA does not state whether this list includes genomic information.256 
Furthermore, the entities covered in HIPAA do not include many entities 
that manage public genomics projects, such as academic institutions, 
federal agencies and scientific consortia.257  Although they are not entities 
covered by HIPAA, they must comply with the privacy protection
requirements of the Common Rule.258 Currently, the de-identification 
requirements for the Common Rule are less strict than for HIPAA.259  The
proposed updates to the Common Rule advocates for distinguishing 
identifiable and de-identified information and adopting the HIPAA standards 
for de-identification.260  For consistency with HIPAA and participant 
privacy protection, the Common Rule should follow HIPAA standards for 
privacy, and factor in the potential risks of re-identification and future 
research.261
 255. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE REGARDING METHODS FOR
DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT (HIPAA) PRIVACY RULE 23 
(2012), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-identification/
hhs_deid_guidance.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FGS-WUWK] (explaining that biometric identifiers 
include fingerprints and voiceprints). 
256. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 171, at 180, 190.  In a proposed
update to the Common Rule regarding human subject research, the Department of Health
and Human Services contemplated including biospecimen, from which genomic DNA can 
be extracted and sequenced, to be re-identifiable information. See supra Part IV.C; Human
Subject Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects and Reducing 
Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 44,524 (July 26, 
2011).
257. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
63–64. 
258. OHRP Guidance, supra note 167.  Academic institutions and consortia that are
governmentally funded are subject to the Common Rule for human subject research. Id.; 
see supra Part IV.C. 
259. OHRP Guidance, supra note 167. See supra Part IV.C for a comparison of
HIPAA and Common Rule Standards. 
260. Human Subject Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for Research Subjects
and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512, 
44,525 (July 26, 2011). 
261. Id.; Prince, supra note 178, at 206–07. 
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B. Addressing the Consent Issue 
1. Updates to the Common Rule
Additional consent for future projects must be addressed separately
from the re-identification ban.262  The Common Rule, which currently
governs federally funded human research, does not require IRB review or
additional consent for studies using data that are stripped of HIPAA 
identifiers.263  The Common Rule should be updated to address future uses
and re-identification concerns for public genomics.  For example, if the 
initial consent did not include information about privacy risks or when it 
can be used for different studies, a new consent should be obtained when
possible.264  In the past, some program participants provided blanket
consent, consent without a limitation on the scope and duration,265 but this 
type of consent is not fully informational because the participants are not
informed of future developments or uses.266  Some programs employ opt-
out models, which advise participants that they will be involved in a future 
research study and to notify the program administrators only if they do not
wish to participate.267 However, although it helps increase participation, opt-
out consent is often not fully informing, and patients prefer the opt-in 
option.268 
262. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2014); Conley et al., supra note 
15, at 351–53; Korenman, supra note 164. 
263. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
63–64; OHRP Guidance, supra note 167. 
264. International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, supra note 216 (“Human
genetic data, human proteomic data and the biological samples collected for one of the 
purposes . . . should not be used for a different purpose that is incompatible with the 
original consent, unless the prior, free, informed and express consent of the person
concerned is obtained . . . .); Lunshof et al., supra note 104. However, an exception should 
be provided for cases where obtaining renewed consent is unduly burdensome, such as 
when the participant is since deceased.  PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL
ISSUES, supra note 1, at 91. 
265.  Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408. 
266. Id.
 267. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
92. 
268. See Margaret F.A. Otlowski, Tackling Legal Challenges Posed by Population 
Biobanks: Reconceptualising Consent Requirements, 20 MED. L. REV. 191, 213 (2012). 
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After the publication of successful re-identification efforts, the HapMap 
Project and the 1000 Genomes project underwent re-consent procedures.269 
The re-consent procedures included removal of the participants’ year of 
birth from the data and informing the participants of the inability to 
guarantee privacy.270  Although obtaining re-consent for public and de­
identified information may be costly,271 updated consent should be obtained 
if the participants can be reached.272 
2. Open Consent 
Open consent is the Personal Genome Project (PGP)’s solution to 
address evolving consent issue.273  Some of the other public genomics
projects’ consent forms include information about re-identification and 
other future risks.274  The PGP is significantly more upfront about the
privacy risks and does not guarantee privacy to the participants.275  Instead 
269. Laura L. Rodriguez et al., The Complexities of Genomic Identifiability, 339
SCIENCE 275, 275 (2013). 
270. Id. at 276. 
271. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
91; Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408.  Obtaining re-consent also poses additional risk
of privacy breach.  Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408.  For example, to contact the 
subject again for additional consent, the database must retain contact information about 
the subject, which can be vulnerable to adversaries aiming to re-identify, because the contact 
information is stored within the database.  See id.; Morrison, supra note 161, at 601; 
Otlowski, supra note 268. 
272. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 14. 
273.  McEwen et al., supra note 240, at 378–79. 
274. See, e.g., Consent to Participate, 1000 GENOMES, http://www.1000genomes. 
org/sites/1000genomes.org/files/docs/Informed%20Consent%20Form%20Template.pdf
[http://perma.cc/EU4S-DM5G] (last visited Aug. 3, 2015).  The 1000 Genomes participant
consent form warns participants that “[a]s technology advances, there may be new ways
of linking information back to you that we cannot foresee now. Also, we cannot always 
foresee the results of research, so new risks may come up in the future that we cannot 
predict now.”  Id.  It asks the participants to weigh the benefits of discovery from genome
research against potential risks themselves. Id.  In contrast, the Coriell Personalized
Medicine Collaborative states that participants have more control, and does not discuss 
currently unknown future risks.  CPMC FAQs, CORIELL PERSONALIZED MED.COLLABORATIVE, 
http://cpmc1.coriell.org/about-the-cpmc-study/cpmc-faqs [http://perma.cc/RHF9-UMTL] 
(last visited Aug. 3, 2015) (“CPMC participants control access to their CPMC information 
through the secure web portal. Your results will not be shared with anyone, for example, 
your doctors, family, friends, employer, insurance company or anyone else, without your
permission.”).
275. See Madeleine P. Ball et al., Harvard Personal Genome Project: Lessons from 
Participatory Public Research, 6 GENOME MED. 10, 10–11 (2014), http://www.geno
memedicine.com/content/pdf/gm527.pdf [http://perma.cc/HF9H-QV92]; Church, supra
note 14, at 53; Conley et al., supra note 15, at 229–30.  The Personal Genome Project 
(PGP) takes the stance that privacy cannot be guaranteed, and “abstains from any assurance to
participants of privacy or anonymity.”  Ball et al., supra, at 10.  Some data scientists 
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of relying on privacy guarantees, the PGP relies on “information altruists”276 
to bear the risks of privacy breaches.277 The PGP focuses on rigorous
privacy education and active participation.278  After enrollment and data
generation, interaction with the participants continues through the website, 
allowing participants to review and add data, and build an ongoing 
relationship with the researchers.279  In turn, the PGP grants the participants 
more control over how much information they will make public.280 
However, once the participant decides to make the information public, it
is available without any access control for the data users.281 
As exemplified in the PGP, the open consent approach can be successfully 
implemented to address the need for additional or updated consent for 
public genomics projects.282  In particular, it can be applied to public
successfully identified PGP participants, who had only some of the information available 
online at the PGP website, by name.  Latanya Sweeney et al., Identifying Participants in
the Personal Genome Project by Name, ARXIV:1304.7605 (Apr. 29, 2013), http://arxiv.
org/abs/1304.7605 [http://perma.cc/7U28-RT9G].
276. “Information altruists” are those who understand and fully accept the privacy
risk yet make their information publicly available.  Conley et al., supra note 15, at 354. 
These “information altruists” must pass a rigorous enrollment exam, which tests how well 
informed the potential participants are about the study and its risks, including the privacy 
risks to the subjects themselves and their relatives.  Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 409. 
Participants must answer all questions correctly.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 2. 
However, simply relying on information altruism without providing other risk-mitigation
measures may also reduce participation because not everyone is comfortable with freely 
providing their information without assurances. McEwen et al., supra note 240, at 378– 
79. Another criticism of the information altruism approach is that having a subset of
population selected as “information altruists” may bias the data. Isaac S. Kohane & Russ 
B. Altman, Health-Information Altruists—A Potentially Critical Resource, 353 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2074, 2075 (2005). 
277.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 2; Conley et al., supra note 15, at 354. 
278.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 6; Conley et al., supra note 15, at 354. 
279.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 6.
 280. Id. at 4–5.  Some participants have identified themselves, such as the founder
George Church, and others have published stories and articles about their own genome. 
See, e.g., John Lauerman, Harvard Mapping My DNA Turns Scary as Threatening Gene 
Emerges, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 14, 2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/2012-02-15/harvard-mapping-my-dna-turns-scary-as-threatening-gene-emerges.html
[http://perma.cc/FL6H-JYCR]; Steven Pinker, My Genome, My Self, N.Y.  TIMES (Jan. 7,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/11/magazine/11Genome-t.html?pagewanted=all
[http://perma.cc/FHX5-8CM5].
281.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 6.
 282. Id. at 1; Conley et al., supra note 15, at 354.  However, the open consent 
approach may not be feasible or suitable for all public genomics projects. McEwen et al., 
supra note 240, at 379. The PGP’s approach sets the bar of participation higher and
reduces the number of potential participants, due to the large number of hurdles to qualify.
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driven crowd-sourced projects, where transparency about privacy risks 
and participant education is critical.283 Open consent and participant-
centric initiatives can be adopted in other projects for uses such as participant
education and updating consent for future studies or future developments.284 
For example, Portable Legal Consent, an interactive informed consent 
document and software that can be used for dynamic genomic projects, 
was built based on PGP’s approach, and can easily be adopted for other 
participatory genomics projects.285 
3. Participant-centric Initiatives 
As a part of an effort to standardize genomic data and develop systems 
for security, storage, and access of genomic data, groups such as the 
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health286 are also developing tools for
participant-centric initiatives.287  Participant-centric initiatives refers to
“tools, programs and projects that empower participants to engage in the
research process using information technology,” and includes easy
interfaces that participants can access to provide consent, obtain data, and
Id. at 377. One study showed that PGP was able to enroll only close to 50% of the 
requesters, with approximately 30% of the requesters not completing or failing the 
enrollment exam.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 2. Additionally, this may limit participation
because many participants desire some type of access control.  Amy L. McGuire et al., To 
Share or Not To Share: A Randomized Trial of Consent for Data Sharing in Genome 
Research, 13 GENETICS IN MED. 948, 948 (2011), http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/
v13/n11/pdf/gim2011159a.pdf [http://perma.cc/PZT3-YJYR].
283. Ball et al., supra note 275, at 6; Heeney et al., supra note 240, at 17; Muhammad
Naveed et al., Privacy and Security in the Genomic Era, ARXIV:1405.1891, 26 (June 17, 
2015), http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.1891 [http://perma.cc/HN2A-97JU].  Although some
crowd-sourced projects do address the issue of consent, consent and education is not as 
extensive as projects that more closely monitor subject participation and consent, such as
the PGP, because crowd-sourced projects are open to a significantly wider population and 
participation is less controlled. See Greshake et al., supra note 70. 
284. Ball et al., supra note 275, at 43; Conley et al., supra note 15, at 4; Gutmann 
Koch, supra note 49, at 9. See infra Part V.B.3, for a discussion on participant-centric 
initiatives.
 285. Portable Consent, SAGE BIONETWORKS, http://sagebase.org/category/portable­
consent/ [http://perma.cc/7QED-DLGD] (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
286. The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health is an international coalition of
research institutions, healthcare providers, funding agencies, disease advocacy groups, and
biotech and information technology companies involved in the study of genomics and 
genomic medicine. Frequently Asked Questions, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR GENOMICS &
HEALTH, http://genomicsandhealth.org/about-the-global-alliance/frequently-asked-questions/
[http://perma.cc/7WD9-LQSV] (last visited Apr. 16, 2015).  The Global Alliance aims to 
maximize the potential of genomic data by promoting effective and responsible genomic 
data sharing and establishing standards to “enable the responsible, voluntary, and secure 
sharing of genomic and clinical data.” Id.
 287. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 25. 
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customize data access control.288  Some public genomics or other public
health projects have successfully used these interfaces and platforms.289 
Developing participant-centric initiatives requires a concerted effort by 
the scientific community.290 Current efforts include developing common 
customizable platforms, such as the Platform for Engaging Everyone 
Responsibly for clinical information and biological specimen,291 and 
standardizing sequencing data formats, to be compatible with many sequencing 
platforms and cloud storage and to easily develop user interfaces.292  User 
interfaces can form a social network-like structure, be used to obtain 
updated consent as necessary, and facilitate the interaction between the 
participants and the scientists accessing the data.293  Particularly for 
crowd-sourced projects where risk and benefit education is not as extensive 
as other public genomics projects,294 these interfaces can be adopted for 
better education and information.295  This type of approach should be used 
for international projects where the local regulation, participant attitude, 
and awareness differ because it can be used to customize data release to
each participant’s comfort level. 296 
C. Addressing Uniform Guidelines: Data Standardization  
and Management 
1. Access Control and Standardization 
Restricting data access can be one way to minimize privacy breach by 
screening out potential adversaries and misusers, without significant costs 
to the researchers that want to access the data for legitimate research
 288. Id.
 289. Kaye et al., supra note 112, at 372.  For examples of public genomics or other 
public health projects, such as PGP and PatientsLikeMe, see supra Part II.B. 
290. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 25. 
291. Platform for Engaging Everyone Responsibly, GENETIC ALLIANCE, http://genetic
alliance.org/programs/biotrust/peer [http://perma.cc/A49M-FWUR] (last visited July 25, 
2015).
292. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 25.  See infra Part V.C.1 for further
discussion on data standardization efforts.
 293. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 10, 16. 
294. See, e.g., Greshake et al., supra note 70. See supra Part II.B. for further 
discussion on participatory genomics projects. 
295.  Kaye et al., supra note 112, at 374. 
296. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 12. 
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reasons.297  Access control measures essentially make public genomics 
less public by screening and controlling users who can use, own or download 
the data.298  This approach can be a complementary solution provided by 
the research community to balance data availability and privacy protection.299 
Reasonable access control is preferred by some research participants as 
a means to mitigate privacy.300  One study of subject consent for data
sharing in the United States found that after a debriefing of three data 
release options–public release, restricted access, or no data release– 
approximately 53% of the subjects chose public release, 33% chose restricted
access, and 14% chose no release.301  This study shows that at least a third 
of the participants prefer some type of access control for the data.302 
Attitudes towards data sharing also differ in different countries and 
demographic groups.303  Generally, there is a willingness to participate in 
public genomics, but with some reservations about privacy concerns
regarding personal data.304  Access control may provide relief to some of 
these reservations of to encourage participation.305  Additionally, a recent 
297. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
80–81. 
298.  Conley et al., supra note 15, at 338–40. 
299. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 1, at 80–81; Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 416–17; dbGaP, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap [http://perma.cc/E5SA-5BAD] 
(last visited July 25, 2015). 
300. See McGuire et al., supra note 282, at 948; Naveed et al., supra note 283, at 
26–27. 
301. McGuire et al., supra note 282, at 952. 
302. See id.
 303. Id. at 950–53; Amy L. McGuire et al., DNA Data Sharing: Research Participants’
Perspectives, 10 GENETICS IN MED. 46, 46–50 (2008); RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 
117, at 7.
 304. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 7. 
305. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 
1, at 80–81; Kaye et al., supra note 112, at 373–75.  A criticism of access control is that it 
provides unnecessary hindrance to research.  Conley et al., supra note 15, at 339–40. Open
source data advocates argue that providing open access is necessary to “maximize the 
potential for discovery,” as access control can serve as a barrier to more scientists 
analyzing the data and making discoveries based on the data. See, e.g., Church, supra note 
14; Greshake et al., supra note 70.  They argue that restricting access to data from public
genomics projects makes these projects not “public,” and does not help “democratize[]
genomics research.”  Conley et al., supra note 15, at 339–40.  For example, the level of 
access for the open access projects, such as the HapMap and 1000 Genomes projects, is 
substantially higher than dbGaP, a controlled access database containing a related dataset. 
Rodriguez et al., supra note 269, at 276.  Another criticism is that controlling access 
provides a false sense of security because genomic data cannot be completely de-identified
and access control cannot guarantee privacy.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 1; Conley et 
al., supra note 15, at 339–40; Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408.  As discussed above 
in Part V.B.2, the Personal Genome Project (PGP) does not guarantee privacy for the 
800
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survey of genomics and genetics experts showed that a majority of the
experts are willing to bear monetary and time costs to protect participant
privacy.306  Furthermore, only 7% of the experts believed that “privacy
enhancing technologies are a nuisance in the case of genetics,”307 indicating 
that access control can be a reasonable solution that to provide privacy
protection for the participants.308 
One example of the access control approach is taken by the database of 
Genotypes and Phenotypes (dbGaP) hosted at the National Center for 
Biotechnology Information.309  A user requesting access to dbGaP must
apply, state their specific uses for the information, and receive approval 
before accessing the data.310  A study of dbGaP user access published in
2013 identified no privacy breaches.311  After the publication of some of
the re-identification studies, institutions such as the National Human
Genome Research Institute, the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute,312 and 
participants, because it cannot be guaranteed.  Ball et al., supra note 275, at 1; Conley et 
al., supra note 15, at 339–40; Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408. 
306. Naveed et al., supra note 283, at 13.  However, the majority of experts indicated 
that they would not trade accuracy of the data for privacy protection. Id.
 307. Id. at 14. 
308. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
80–81. 
309. NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., supra note 299. 
310. Id.
311. Erin M. Ramos et al., Commentary, A Mechanism for Controlled Access to
GWAS Data: Experience of the GAIN Data Access Committee, 92 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS
479, 484–85 (2013), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0002929713000803 
[http://perma.cc/7M4W-F5EX].  However, there were eight technical data management 
incidents, which were violations of the terms of agreement.  Id.
312. The Wellcome Trust, founded by Sir Henry Wellcome, is a charitable
foundation based in London, England, that provides research funding for biomedical research, 
including genomic research.  About Us, WELLCOME TR., http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About­
us/index.htm [http://perma.cc/39VL-TQR7] (last visited Jan. 17, 2015). The Wellcome 
Trust also established the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute in Cambridge, England, one of 
the most prominent genomics research institutes in the world and a participant in the 
Human Genome Project (HGP).  About Us, WELLCOME TR. SANGER INST., http://www.sanger. 
ac.uk/about/ [http://perma.cc/67DF-RHJ5] (last modified Apr. 19, 2013). 
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the Broad Institute313 started restricting public access to pooled genomic
data.314 
These measures must also be accompanied by policies that require users 
to not distribute the data or use it for purposes other than research.315 For 
example, to be approved for access to dbGaP, users must agree to several
conditions, including: (1) storing the data in a secure location, (2) not 
distributing the data, (3) not attempting re-identification, and (4) reporting 
use and any adverse events. 316  The recently released NIH Data Sharing 
Policy sets forth policies and the responsibilities of the users who access 
the available data.317  Although this specific policy only encompasses 
NIH-funded studies,318 similar research governance policies should be in 
place for other control access databases and projects that are not NIH­
funded.319 
Another layer of access control can involve access auditing.320  A “trust­
but-verify” query audit allows monitoring of any adverse events to deter
malicious users.321  This approach requires a standardized interface for the
analysis of genomic data.322  Private healthcare providers have used 
313. The Broad Institute, located in Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a leading biomedical
research institute focusing on genomics and genomic medicine. Areas of Focus, BROAD
INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/areas-focus/areas-focus [https://perma.cc/
8XCT-QRSJ] (last visited July 25, 2015).  It was founded by Eli and Edythe L. Broad and
is affiliated with Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. History
& Leadership, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/history-leadership/history­
leadership [https://perma.cc/Z893-2QFZ] (last visited July 25, 2015).  The Broad Institute
is also one of the leaders in the effort to make genomic data securely accessible.  Our 
Approach, BROAD INST., https://www.broadinstitute.org/what-broad/our-approach/our­
approach [https://perma.cc/FL4U-UVPN] (last visited July 25, 2015). 
314. Misha Angrist, Eyes Wide Open: The Personal Genome Project, Citizen Science
and Veracity in Informed Consent, 6 PERSP. MED. 691, 692 n.6 (2009); Naveed et al., supra
note 283, at 26. 
315. See, e.g., NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 205. 
316. dbGaP Approved User Code of Conduct, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY
INFO., https://dbgap.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/aa/Code_of_Conduct.html [https://perma.cc/G4TS­
XAGL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2015). 
317.  Final NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, 79 Fed. Reg. 51,345, 51,352 (Aug. 28, 
2014). See also Genomic Data User Code of Conduct, supra note 205.  For a discussion
of the NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, see supra Part IV.E. 
318. Genomic Data User Code of Conduct, supra note 205. 
319. See Knoppers, supra note 25, at 1–4. 
320.  Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 417. 
321. Id.  “Trust-but-verify” trusts the users to make queries to the data without 
downloading it, records the queries, and verifies that the users did not execute any malicious 
queries. Id. 
322. Id.  Currently, genomic formats are not under uniform standards, which makes
auditing efforts more difficult. Id.; RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 19–20. 
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computational methods to audit for suspicious access to records.323  Similar
approaches can be adopted to audit user access in genomic databases with
controlled access, and across different data formats and platforms if data
formats are standardized.324 
To implement data management and security measures more effectively, 
efforts to standardize data formats and platforms should be a priority for 
projects where participants and researchers are global.325  Some leaders of 
the genomic research community are working to establish standard formats 
for genomic data and analysis tools, to facilitate effective and secure 
genomic data sharing.326  Setting uniform data standards will allow for
more secure storage and easier access control.327  These standards will also
provide a more consistent framework across platforms for data analysis for
the researchers. 328  In addition, data standards and platforms can provide
participants easier access to and more control over their data, and allow 
interaction with researchers and other communities through tools built on 
the platforms.329 
323. Aziz A. Boxwala et al., Using Statistical and Machine Learning to Help 
Institutions Detect Suspicious Access To Electronic Health Records, 18 J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASS’N 498, 503 (2011).  The method uses a statistical model and electronic
health record access logs to identify rare suspicious access events, such as accessing more 
than 200 records in a day, accessing a coworker’s record or accessing a neighbor’s record. 
Id.
 324. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 417; RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 
117, at 19–20. 
325. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 10. 
326. Some of the scientific community is working to establish standardization of 
genomic data. See, e.g., Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 417; RESPONSIBLE SHARING, 
supra note 117, at 10; SAMtools, SOURCEFORGE.NET, http://samtools.sourceforge.net/
[http://perma.cc/7TBZ-L9MW] (last modified Sept. 9, 2012); Welcome to VCFtools, 
VCFTOOLS, https://vcftools.github.io/index.html [https://perma.cc/4AUC-9QDR] (last visited 
Aug. 3, 2015).
327. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 9–10. 
328. Some genomic databases are currently available on cloud services such as 
Amazon Web Services. See supra note 12.  Standardization of data formats will facilitate 
access and analysis across different sequencing and analysis platforms. RESPONSIBLE
SHARING, supra note 117, at 10. 
329. RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117, at 10, 13.  For example, standardized 
data and analysis tools will greatly facilitate development of tools for updated consent
based on participant-centric initiatives. See supra Part V.B.1. 
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2. Added Security Measures: Encryption and Anonymization 
Data custodians can use encryption, the process of making data unreadable
except to those who possess the encryption key,330 to mitigate privacy 
issues for genomic information.331  One example of encryption techniques
involves encrypting and storing genomic information on the cloud.332  It
only allows users to make computational queries and receive interpreted 
results from the cloud instead of downloading the raw data set to make 
those queries locally, essentially restricting access to the entire raw data.333 
A genomic database for biological relative search effectively employed 
this approach, allowing users to input their genomic information and
identify relatives, but not providing access the individual relative’s data.334 
In addition to encryption techniques and basic de-identification by 
stripping the data of HIPAA identifiers, computer scientists and statisticians 
have developed other anonymization techniques to mitigate privacy
breaches.335  One method is k-anonymity, which ensures that no record is
unique in that dataset.336  Another technique is differential privacy, which 
330. Encryption techniques, including security certificates, are widely used in various
websites to ensure safe communication and data transfer between computers. What Is 
Encryption?, SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, A PROJECT OF THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION, https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/what-encryption [https://perma.cc/A28Y-MV5Z]
(last updated Nov. 3, 2014).  Similar encryption techniques can be used for databases 
containing genomic information. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 418–19. 
Mathematicians and cryptographers are developing new algorithms to apply to different
types of computational data, such as genomic data. Id.
331. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 418–19; Lucila Ohno-Machado et al., 
Genomes in the Cloud: Balancing Privacy Rights and the Public Good, 2013 AMIA
SUMMITS ON TRANSLATIONAL SCIENCE PROCEEDINGS 128 (2013). One criticism of 
encryption methods is that they substantially limit what a researcher can do with the data
and requires constant participation from the data guardian, dramatically increasing the cost
of the use of the data. Ohm, supra note 9, at 1756.  Furthermore, even the best systems 
for encryption and cloud computation are prone to bugs. Id. at 1757; Naveed et al., supra
note 283. However, as increasingly more data becomes available online in cloud systems, 
a cryptographic solution can be an additional safeguard to these databases. Erlich & 
Narayanan, supra note 22, at 418–19. 
332.  Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 418–19. 
333. Id. at 418 (providing a query of risk calculations for a specific risk factor as an 
example).  Users cannot “possess” the data by downloading to their own computers.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 75. 
334. See Dan He et al., Identifying Genetic Relatives Without Compromising Privacy, 
24 GENOME RES. 664, 664–65 (2014). 
335. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 417–18; Ohm, supra note 9, at 1755–56. 
336. Sweeney, supra note 77, at 557.  K-anonymity takes out some of the identifiers
in the data set so that at least k-1 records have the same combination of identifiers, 
preventing unique identification of one record.  Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 
417–18; Sweeney, supra note 77, at 557.  However, if the k value is set too high, it may
reduce the use of the data by leaving out critical information.  Erlich & Narayanan, supra
note 22, at 417–18. 
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adds controlled noise to the dataset before release, essentially making it 
unclear whether a record was in the original data set or in the noise set.337 
Although these methods alone cannot solve the issue of privacy breaches 
in public genomic data, they can provide added layers of security to make 
malicious breaches and re-identification more difficult.338 
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent advancement in sequencing technologies and internet-based
data sharing has borne the exciting fruits of public and participatory 
genomics.339  The increase of publicly available genomic data greatly
facilitated advances in human genetics, but at a cost of increased privacy 
concerns.340  Recent re-identification studies have highlighted the privacy
risks and a need for stronger privacy protection for those who contribute 
their genomic data to these projects.341 There must be a balance between 
data availability for scientific advancement and participant privacy 
protection.342  Complete privacy guarantees are difficult because unique
personal information is inherent and permanent in the genomic data.343 
Due to the complexity of the problem, there is no silver bullet, but only a
multimeric solution.344 
The most critical component of the solution is a legislative ban of 
malicious re-identification and strengthened anti-discrimination protection.345 
Although some measures are already in place, most legislation excludes 
de-identified public information.346  These legislative protections must 
337. Noise refers to random data that does not contain meaningful information.  See
Kato Mivule, Utilizing Noise Addition for Data Privacy, an Overview, ARXIV:1309.3958
(2013), http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1309/1309.3958.pdf [http://perma.cc/D3EQ-3ZLH]; 
Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 417–18.  Differential privacy has been used in some 
GWAS studies, although the amount of noise that has to be added has so far made it 
impractical.  Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 418–19. 
338. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 22, at 417–18; Ohm, supra note 9, at 1755–56. 
339. See supra Part II.B. 
340. See supra Part III. 
341. See supra Part III.A. 
342. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
101. 
343. See, e.g., Ball et al., supra note 275, at 1.
 344. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra
note 1, at 100–01. 
345. See supra Part V.A.
 346. Rothstein, supra note 87, at 8.
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expand to consider re-identification risks, to protect the participants from 
privacy breaches, and to offer adequate remedies.347 
To address the issues of consent, the Common Rule should be updated,
factoring in the re-identification risks.348  Additionally, implementing various
access, education, and consent tools can encourage more informed
participation.349 
A complementary component of the multimeric solution is the adoption 
of standards by the research community.350  Data standardization is critical 
not only in storing, managing and analyzing data across different platforms 
and projects, but is also important in facilitating patient participation, 
access management, implementation of protective measures and interactive 
consent, and can aid in providing standard privacy protection for international
collaborative projects.351  Reasonable mitigation of re-identification risks
with this multimeric approach will encourage participation and data 
contribution in public and participatory genomics projects, and foster a 
more profound understanding of human genetics and evolution.352
 347. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 
68–69. 
348. See, e.g., Human Subject Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for Investigators, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 44,512, 44,524 (July 26, 2011); supra Part V.B.1. 
349. See, e.g., Ball et al., supra note 275, at 1; Kaye et al., supra note 112, at 372; 
Lunshof et al., supra note 104, at 408; Portable Consent , supra note 285. 
350. See, e.g., RESPONSIBLE SHARING, supra note 117. 
351. See supra Part V.C.1. 
352. See PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 
1, at 52–54; McGuire et al., supra note 282, at 948. 
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